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We consider settings in which skilled experts have private, heterogeneous types. Contracts that
evaluate experts based on outcomes are used to dierentiate between types. However, experts
can take unobservable actions to manipulate their outcomes, which may harm consumers. For
example, surgeons may privately engage in harmful selection behavior to avoid risky patients and
hence improve observed performance. In this paper we solve for optimal evaluation contracts
that maximize consumer welfare. We nd that an optimal contract takes the form of a scoring
rule, typically characterized by four regions: (1) high score sensitivity to outcomes, (2) low score
sensitivity to outcomes, (3) tenure, and (4) ring or license revocation. When improvement is
possible, an optimal contract for the low quality expert is a xed-length mentorship program. In
terms of methods, we draw upon continuous-time techniques, as introduced in Sannikov (2007b).
Since our problem involves both adverse selection and moral hazard, this paper features novel
applications of continuous-time methods in contract design.
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11 Introduction
This paper is motivated by the experience with performance reporting for cardiac surgeons. In the
past, the only way to distinguish between surgeons of dierent abilities was through informal word-
of-mouth reputations. Those could be biased or inaccurate, and at best incomplete. In recent years,
however, as the collection, compilation and dispersion of data have become easier, policy makers
have been keen to create \score cards" that evaluate surgeons based on outcomes, with the intention
of identifying high-performing and low-performing surgeons. Beginning in the early 1990's, state
agencies in New York and Pennsylvania have released hospital- and surgeon-specic data on risk-
adjusted cardiac surgery mortality rates (PA in late 1991, NY in late 1992). Other organizations
have been following suit (e.g. NJ in 1997, CA in 2001).
There are at least two ways in which score cards can improve patient welfare. First, they can lead
to more ecient sorting in the market: better surgeons treat more dicult cases, worse surgeons
treat less dicult cases, and very bad surgeons leave the market completely. Secondly, score cards
can induce additional investments in quality and higher levels of eort.
Despite the potential benets, skeptics of score cards argue that they may harm patients because
providers are encouraged to distort their behavior. For example, surgeons can in
ate their scores
through risk selection, focusing on patients who are relatively healthy and avoiding patients who are
sick. A survey in Pennsylvania reveals that as a consequence of report cards' introduction, 63% of
cardiac surgeons report having only accepted healthier candidates for CABG surgery,1 and 59% of
cardiologists report increased diculty nding surgeons willing to perform needed CABG surgery in
severely ill patients (Schneider & Epstein 1996) . A similar survey in New York reports that 62% of
surgeons have refused to operate on at least one high-risk CABG patient over the prior year primarily
because of public reporting, and that report cards have led to a signicantly higher percentage of
high-risk CABG patients being treated non-operatively (Burack, Impellizzeri, Homel & Jr. 1999).2
In this paper, we present a model with heterogeneous types in which experts (a) know their
own private types, (b) generate observable outcomes that can be used to measure performance, and
1CABG refers to \coronary artery bypass graft" surgery, which is the specic cardiac procedure most commonly
measured in state score cards.
2Dranove, Kessler, McClellan and Satterthwaite (2003) study the empirical eects of introducing cardiac surgery
score cards in NY and PA and conclude that the net eects have been to reduce overall welfare, citing increased selection
behavior by physicians, higher levels of resource use, and worse health outcomes. Dranove et al. do observe, however,
that score cards have led to improved sorting between physicians and patients. See Epstein (2006) for a summary of
the empirical and medical literature.
2(c) have the ability to take private actions, potentially harmful to consumers, that in
ate those
outcomes. We take a normative approach and fully characterize an optimal evaluation mechanism
that maximizes patient welfare. By doing so, we establish a baseline for the best-case scenario.
The medical literature has emphasized improving risk adjustment techniques as the major solution
to performance manipulation issues (Werner, Asch & Polsky 2005). In theory, perfect risk adjustment
can eliminate the incentives for risk selection. The fundamental assumption we make, however, is
that in practice a surgeon will always have better information about a patient's risk prole than a
scoring mechanism. So long as risk adjustment is not perfect, the moral hazard for surgeons to
distort their behavior is impossible to eliminate, and we can only seek to minimize its harm.3
Our model is closely related to the class of \bad reputation" games introduced by Ely and V alim aki
(2003). In such games, reputation is labeled \bad" because the introduction of performance histories,
i.e. reputation, may adversely aect all players, often leading to complete market breakdown. If
represented as a reputation game, our setting with surgeons would also be prone to bad reputation
eects. The key tension is that higher outcomes, generally associated with a higher ability type,
can be roughly mimicked through risk selection. Hence, making future payos depend on those
outcomes tempts surgeons to distort their behavior. Ironically, even though performance reporting
is introduced to solve the adverse selection problem of not knowing whether a surgeon is of high
ability or low ability, that introduction creates an inevitable moral hazard to manipulate reports.
The existing theoretical literature on optimal contract design has not yet shed light on such settings.
The main portion of our paper treats surgeons' types as xed, disallowing improvement, and
focuses on welfare gains from improved sorting. One feature we emphasize is that selection behavior
can be welfare-enhancing. In particular, if bad surgeons avoid risky patients, those patients may
be better o overall from receiving a substitute procedure or being treated by a dierent surgeon.
This observation has been made in Dranove et al. (2003), where authors cite \the failure of previous
studies to consider the entire population at risk for CABG, rather than only those who receive it."
Hence, in our model patient welfare improves via two types of sorting: (1) inducing bad surgeons
3Even if risk adjustment becomes perfect, dierent types of moral hazard may present themselves. For example,
when risk factors used for risk adjustment are reported by surgeons or institutions themselves, Epstein (1995) observes
that risk adjustment provides incentives for \upcoding." After New York began to report risk-adjusted mortality
rates, there was \a dramatic increase in the prevalence reported by hospitals of the co-existing conditions used in the
state's risk-adjustment model." In another example, Shahian et al. (2001) note that surgeons can perform additional
procedures at the same time as CABG surgery, thereby disqualifying the procedure from being included in reporting
(since it is not an isolated CABG).
3to avoid dicult cases, and (2) ring bad surgeons. Our primary task then is to characterize an
optimal evaluation mechanism that separates good surgeons from bad surgeons while minimizing the
incentives for good surgeons to distort behavior and maximizing the incentives for bad surgeons to
restrict themselves to good risks.
We nd that there exists an optimal evaluation contract that takes the form of a scoring rule, in
which a surgeon's past performance is summarized by a single \score." Our key insight for score card
design lies in our characterization of rules according to which the score varies with performance, i.e.
the score's sensitivity to outcomes. The optimal scoring rule includes the possibility of both ring
(e.g. license revocation) and tenure, regardless of the surgeon's type. Interestingly, the scoring rule
for the good surgeon includes two additional scoring regimes: one in which the surgeon's score is
highly sensitive to performance (a\hot seat"), and another in which the surgeon's score is much less
sensitive to performance (\benet of the doubt"). Furthermore, a simplifying lemma (Lemma 1)
shows that in our optimal mechanism the principal does not reveal any information to patients until
the surgeon has been red.
At the end of the paper, we apply our methods to a related but distinct question. We introduce
the possibility of improvement through eort and mentored experience. In this case the optimal
evaluation mechanism can be implemented as a scoring rule for the good surgeon and a nite-length
mentorship program for the bad surgeon. In equilibrium, after completing the mentorship program,
bad surgeons elect to improve to good types.
The issue of performance or quality reporting in healthcare is complex and involves many dierent
questions. For example, what denes quality or high performance? What specic measures should
be used for evaluation? When should surgeons and institutions be measured jointly and when should
they be measured separately? Such questions require deep thought and research by experts in relevant
areas before a complete proposal is created. However, most lie outside the realm of economic theory.
One question that may lie within the realm of economic theory but that we do not deal with in this
paper is whether performance reporting should be made available to the public. Addressing that
question requires careful modeling of demand-side behavior. In this paper, we make a brief comment
on whether reports should be public, but our focus is largely on the eect of performance evaluation
on the behavior of providers.
We emphasize that money does not appear in our model. While that absence limits applications
4to other experts, it accurately portrays settings in healthcare. Money can appear in the form of prices
that surgeons set or transfers that a contract species. In healthcare (as in education), prices rarely
play their usual role. Instead, they are typically xed and constrained from responding to factors
such as perceived quality and public reputation. Although we admit that incorporating transfers into
the model will be interesting, seeing what we can achieve without transfers is highly relevant. For one
thing, as Epstein et al. (2004) note, nancial incentives for performance may \threaten the sense of
professionalism, autonomy, and job satisfaction among physicians" and \underscore the inadequacy
of professionalism as a means of self-regulation and quality assurance." Transfers may be viewed as
interference in the art and skill of medicine. Although momentum is building around eorts to link
pay with performance, in today's healthcare markets policy makers must rely on mechanisms other
than money to positively in
uence market dynamics.
In this paper, we employ continuous-time techniques. Relative to discrete-time methods, continuous-
time methods have proven more successful in answering questions similar to ours. For example, in
principal-agent models with pure moral hazard, known methods to solve discrete-time contracts
are computationally intensive and their full characterization is dicult (Spear & Srivastava (1987),
Phelan & Townsend (1991)). Meanwhile, Sannikov (2007b) has recently shown that contracts in
continuous-time have a simple characterization by an ordinary dierential equation. In the long-
term contracting problem we consider, the additional feature of adverse selection is reminiscent of
two-player games with imperfect monitoring, since each type \plays" against a ctional version of the
other type. In discrete time, results in repeated games have been limited to identifying achievable
payos as players become suciently patient, i.e. when  approaches one (e.g. Fudenberg & Levine
(1992), Fudenberg, Levine & Maskin (1994)). On the other hand, research using continuous-time
methods has succeeded in characterizing the set of payos for xed discount factors (Sannikov (2007c),
Faingold & Sannikov (2007)). Since computing contracts for a xed discount factor is essential in
our application to surgeons, we choose to use a continuous-time model.
2 Related Literature
Although this paper is related to the literature on credence goods, our main point of departure
lies in disregarding the role of prices and focusing on performance measurement as the avenue for
5providing incentives.4 Ely and V alim aki (2003) also study credence goods and disregard prices.
Using a stylized model of mechanics, the authors show that the introduction of reputation may lead
to complete market breakdown.5 In our paper, instead of focusing on the specic mechanism of
reputation in which experts are evaluated via Bayesian updating on their type, we characterize the
optimal evaluation mechanism.
At the end of their paper, Ely and V alim aki (2003) consider a long-term principal-agent setup
similar to ours. They show that in the limit as players become suciently patient, the bad reputation
eect disappears. To prove the result, the authors consider an evaluation mechanism using a \score"
that is similar in some respects to the optimal scoring rules we identify. Our use of continuous-time
methods, however, enables us to characterize and compute the optimal scoring rule for any discount
rate and to verify that a scoring rule is indeed an optimal way to provide incentives.
The origin of continuous-time contracting lies in principal-agent models with pure moral hazard.
Sannikov (2007b) shows that an optimal contract with dynamic moral hazard is characterized by
a simple ordinary dierential equation. Our paper follows his approach. Others have taken dier-
ent approaches to continuous-time contracting with moral hazard, including Williams (2004), and
Westereld (2006).
Building on the above work, several recent papers have studied continuous-time contracting with
both adverse selection and moral hazard, as we study in this paper. Sannikov (2007a) solves for
the optimal dynamic nancing contract for a cash-constrained entrepreneur with a hidden type.
Sung (2005) solves for an optimal continuous-time contract in a setting where the principal can
only observe the initial and nal values of the underlying signal process. As a result, the optimal
contract is linear and the optimal actions of the agent are constant across time. Cvitanic and Zhang
(2006) consider a general setup with both moral hazard and adverse selection over an interval of
agent types. Rather than continuous payments, they allow for bulk payments only at the end of a
nite time period. Because of their generality, Cvitanic and Zhang are not able to fully characterize
optimal contracts.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3, we describe the model and formally present the
4Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) dene a credence good as any good or service where an expert knows more about
what a consumer needs than the consumer himself. Papers on credence goods include Wolinsky (1993), Taylor (1995),
and Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006).
5Ely, Fudenberg and Levine (2002) go on to identify more general conditions under which such \bad reputation
eects" occur.
6problem. Section 4 introduces the optimal menu of evaluation contracts and solves for the easier
contract, the contract for the bad surgeon. Section 5 solves for the harder contract, introducing
novel applications of continuous-time techniques in contract design. In Section 6, we complete the
characterization of the optimal menu of evaluation contracts. Section 7 presents some numerical
examples to provide more concrete insight, and in Section 8 we brie
y discuss an extension that
incorporates the possibility of improvement. Section 9 concludes.
3 The Model
We consider the example of surgery. There is a principal who designs contracts, and an agent. The
agent, whom we call the surgeon, lives in all periods t 2 [0;1). With probability p the surgeon is a
good type  = G, and with probability 1   p he is a bad type  = B. The surgeon knows his own
private type.
At each time t, a mass of patients Dt 2 [0;1] visits the surgeon, and the surgeon chooses a private
action at 2 A where we let AG = AB = A = f0;1g.6 When Dt = 1 the surgeon is fully employed,
and when Dt = 0 he sees no patients. The action at can be broadly interpreted as any hidden action
that in
ates performance. For the purposes of our discussion, however, we interpret at concretely
as indicating whether the surgeon (privately) engages in selection behavior. In particular, at can
represent the fraction of risky patients on whom the surgeon chooses to avoid being evaluated by
treating with an alternative procedure. Empirical evidence conrms that surgeons are able to shift
their practices towards healthier patients. Dranove et al. (2003) nd that report cards have caused
an increase in the quantity of CABG surgery for healthier patients, explaining that surgeons heavily
in
uence whether a patient receives a CABG or an alternative cardiac procedure such as angioplasty
or other revascularization treatments. Additionally, Omoigui et al. (1996) report that in New York
the number of patients transferred to the world-renowned Cleveland Clinic has increased by 31%
after the release of report cards and that generally these transfer patients have higher risk proles
than patients transferred to the Cleveland Clinic from other states.7
6Technically, we can accommodate any nite action space A
 if both the type- surgeon's payo function and his
technology (dened on the next page) are \convex" in a (i.e. increment sizes increase in a). In the limit as jAj goes to
1, the necessary and sucient condition approaches linearity of both functions.
7One may argue that transferring patients to the Cleveland Clinic is an observable action, but the point is that
since the number of transfers is not a reported measure, surgeons so far have been able to use it as a private action
to aect performance. Nonetheless, it will be interesting in future work to accommodate additional signals such as a
monitoring process of a. That is currently outside the scope of our model.
7While the surgeon's action at time t is not observable, if Dt > 0 then both the principal and
the surgeon observe a noisy signal Xt that summarizes the surgeon's outcomes. The path of this
signal depends on both the surgeon's action and his type. We model the signal as a continuous-time
diusion process, which, if Dt > 0, evolves according to
dXt = (at;)dt + dZt;
where fZtgt0 is a standard Brownian motion and the volatility  is a constant. We call the drift
(a;) the technology of the type- surgeon. Denote by fFtgt0 the ltration generated by fXtgt0.
If Dt = 0, no information is learned.
All else equal, good surgeons generate higher signals than bad surgeons so that (a;G) > (a;B)
for all a 2 A. In other words, for a xed action, the drift of the good surgeon's signal strictly exceeds
the drift of the bad surgeon's signal. However { and here is the critical component of our setup
that generates moral hazard { the drift of Xt also increases in at so that (1;)   (0;) = k > 0.
Engaging in selection behavior improves observed performance. Furthermore, we assume that kB >
kG so that the marginal improvement in performance is larger for the bad surgeon than for the good
surgeon. Hence when both surgeons are selecting risk, there is weaker separation between the two
types' performances. This re
ects the fact that the good surgeon has a comparative advantage over
the bad surgeon in dealing with dicult cases, as suggested by Capps et al. (2001).
The 
ow payos of the type- surgeon are Dtg(at;). The payo function g(at;) is decreasing
in at so that the surgeon's payos decrease when he engages in selection behavior. In other words,
risk selection, i.e. identifying risky patients and then avoiding them or substituting an alternative
procedure for them, is costly. Let us normalize g(0;) = 1 and let g(1;) = 1    > 0. The
parameter  may be related to the proportion of risky patients in the population, or  may re
ect
the ease or diculty with which surgeons of dierent types select risk. We introduce  = 1  > 0
as useful notation. We assume that the surgeon discounts payos at some rate r > 0, so the type-









8The factor r normalizes payos to the scale of 
ow payos.
8The principal can fully commit at time t = 0 to any history-dependent contract. We do not allow
renegotation. Her objective is to maximize expected patient welfare. Patient welfare depends on
both the surgeon's action and his type. Let Dth(at;) represent the expected 
ow payo to patients
from a surgeon of type  who takes action at 2 A. We assume that h(at;G) is strictly decreasing
in its rst parameter so that selection behavior by a good surgeon is detrimental to patients. This
generates a potentially adverse eect on patient welfare. Meanwhile, we assume that h(at;B) is
strictly increasing in its rst parameter. This generates a potentially benecial eect on patient
welfare. It follows that
0 = argmax
a02A
h(a0;G) and 1 = argmax
a02A
h(a0;B):
That curiosity may create an additional tension in the model: although selection behavior by good
surgeons is detrimental to patient welfare, selection behavior by bad surgeons improves patient wel-
fare.9 A simple explanation is that there exists an outside option such that risky patients who would
be selected against derive a higher payo from the outside option than from a surgery performed
by a bad surgeon. It is easily the case that a very sick patient will be better o being declined by
a bad surgeon for a CABG and then either undergoing an alternative cardiac procedure or nding
a dierent surgeon. Empirically, it has been suggested that sick patients have more to gain from a
good surgeon over a bad surgeon. For example, Capps et al. (2001) nd that sick patients are more
willing to incur travel and nancial costs to see a high quality provider.
We assume that patients discount payos at the same rate r as surgeons, so aggregate expected









One nal modeling assumption remains. Recall that we are interested in establishing a baseline
for the highest patient welfare achievable. In our analysis, we assume that the good surgeon is not
only highly-skilled but also altruistic. Like \good" experts in the bad reputation models, the good
surgeon fully aligns his interests with patients and acts to maximize patient welfare. So we have
9This is a feature of the model that has been somewhat neglected in the empirical literature. It is dicult for
those studies to take into account patients who do not undergo the specic procedure and instead undergo a substitute
procedure.
9g(a;G) / h(a;G). Meanwhile, the bad surgeon cannot align his interests with patients and instead
acts in his own self-interest. In the health literature, economic models of physician behavior often
include or discuss altruism (see, for example, De Jaegher and Jegers (2000)).
Adaptation to Other Experts: Mechanics. We emphasize that our model is 
exible and can
accommodate other skilled experts. We show brie
y how an amendment of Ely and V alim aki's
mechanics setup (in which both types are strategic) ts into our model (2003).
A mechanic is one of two types:  2 fG;Bg. The 
ow Dt 2 [0;1] re
ects car-owners bringing in
their cars for repair. Each car is either in need of a tune-up (state t) or in need of an engine change
(state e). Only a mechanic can identify whether the state is t or e.
The good mechanic has interests aligned with car-owners. He maximizes his payo by being
honest: performing tune-ups when the state is t and performing engine changes when the state is
e. Denote this honest strategy as the action 0G. The mechanic is also capable of only performing
tune-ups regardless of the state, even though doing so gives him a lower payo. Denote this dishonest
strategy as the action 1G. So the good mechanic chooses an action aG
t 2 f0G;1Gg where g(0G;G) >
g(1G;G).
The bad mechanic maximizes his payo by always performing engine changes, regardless of the
state. Denote this engine change strategy by the action 0B. He is also capable of being honest,
although doing so gives him a lower payo. Denote this honest strategy by 1B. So the bad mechanic
chooses an action aB
t 2 f0B;1Bg where g(0B;B) > g(1B;B).
Let Xt be a noisy summary signal re
ecting the number of tune-ups performed by a mechanic.
This may be generated by surveying car-owners and informally gathering data about the frequency
of tune-ups.10 Recall that (at;) is the drift of the signal Xt. It follows from our setup that
(1G;G) > (0G;G) and (1B;B) > (0B;B) since in each case the action 1 involves more tune-
ups. We can see that (1G;G) > (1B;B) and (0G;G) > (0B;B). Finally, we have (1G;G)  
(0G;G) > (1B;B)   (0B;B) so that the performance improvement of a bad mechanic when he
switches from only replacing engines to being honest is greater than that of an honest mechanic who
switches from behaving honestly to only doing tune-ups.
10(It is essential that the action strategy of the mechanic not be perfectly observed. If the number of tune-ups and
the number of engine changes are perfectly observed, we can introduce \noise" car-owners in the mix who in fact do
know the true state of their vehicles and thus dictate the repair performed by the mechanic.
103.1 Evaluation Contracts and Scoring Rules
In general, a contract oered by the principal species demand Dt (i.e. the mass of patients visiting
the surgeon) along with recommended actions at every moment in time contingent on the surgeon's
entire signal history. The principal can aect demand either through information she releases, quotas
she imposes, or other controls she exercises. We do not need to specify exactly how much power the
principal has because, according to Lemma 1, regardless of other powers the principal may have to
control demand, there exists an optimal contract in which she will only exercise the power to revoke
a surgeon's license. When the principal does not aect demand, we assume that patients arrive at a
unit rate Dt = 1. Lemma 1 implies that we can restrict attention to contracts in which the principal
simply species a history-dependent stopping time after which she cuts o demand permanently.
Lemma 1. There exists an optimal contract in which the principal species demand Dt 2 f0;1g.
Furthermore, after any moment in time at which Dt = 0, it follows that Dt0 = 0 for all t0 > t.
Proof. See proof in Appendix A.4.
So it is optimal for the principal either to fully employ the surgeon or to take away his license,
and nothing in between. The intuition is similar to discrete time. Generally, any optimal contract
in which Dt 2 (0;1) can be converted to an optimal contract in which Dt 2 f0;1g by modifying
continuation paths appropriately. Furthermore, it is optimal never to suspend a surgeon's license
temporarily but instead to revoke it permanently. The idea is that suspension only serves to \punish"
the surgeon while the principal gains no additional information; hence suspension is suboptimal.
Ely and V alim aki (2003) remark that bad reputation eects are generated by short-term inter-
actions and suggest that contracts of a long-term nature improve welfare. Lemma 1 implies the
existence of an optimal long-term contract in which the principal does not release any information
to patients, who may act myopically; instead, the principal only wants to disclose when the surgeon
has been red.
Since this is a setting with incomplete information where the surgeon's type  is privately known,
the Revelation Principle tells us that we can restrict attention to direct revelation mechanisms in
which each surgeon announces his type truthfully at time 0. The principal just needs to choose a pair
of outcome-dependent stopping rules G and B, which map outcome paths to a stopping time in
[0;1) (i.e. the point at which licenses are revoked). If the surgeon announces  = G, he is assigned
11the stopping rule G, and if the surgeon announces  = B, he is assigned the stopping rule B.11
We call such contracts evaluation contracts and proceed to dene them more formally. There
are two contracts, one for each type . In order to verify that surgeons will reveal their types
truthfully and self-select into the appropriate contracts, and also to compute the principal's prots,
we conveniently include recommended action strategies into the denition of contracts. Thus, we
write an evaluation contract for the good surgeon as
CG = fG;AG; ^ ABg
where G is an Xt-measurable stopping time, AG = faG
t gt2[0;G] is the recommended (feasible) Xt-
measurable action strategy for the good surgeon, and ^ AB = f^ aB
t gt2[0;G] is an optimal (feasible)
Xt-measurable strategy for the bad surgeon in this contract. The purpose of introducing ^ AB is to
verify that the bad surgeon does not want to deviate and be assigned to the good surgeon's contract.
Similarly, we write an evaluation contract for the bad surgeon as
CB = fB;AB; ^ AGg
where B is an Xt-measurable stopping time, AB = faB
t gt2[0;B] is the recommended (feasible)
Xt-measurable action strategy for the bad surgeon, and ^ AG = f^ aG
t gt2[0;B] is an optimal (feasible)
Xt-measurable strategy for the good surgeon in this contract, introduced to verify that the good
surgeon will truthfully reveal his type.
The principal oers the menu of evaluation contracts (CG;CB). A menu is optimal if and only if







t ;G)dt j  = G
#






t ;B)dt j  = B
#
over all menus of evaluation contracts (CG;CB). A result in this paper is that each evaluation
contract in an optimal menu takes the form of a scoring rule. We dene a scoring rule as follows:
Denition 1. An evaluation contract C is a scoring rule if it satises the following conditions:
11Note that we can restrict attention to deterministic stopping times since mixing over multiple stopping times is
equivalent to a deterministic stopping time in expectation.
121. there exists a single state variable, which we call the score, that completely summarizes the past
performance history,
2. the score evolves continuously and is measurable with respect to the agent's performance, and
3. there exists a threshold such that if the score drops below the threshold, play terminates.
3.2 What is First-Best?
Suppose the principal can observe the surgeon's type and dictate the surgeon's actions. What is
the outcome that maximizes patient welfare? Conditional on the type of surgeon, recall that two
variables aect patient welfare: the demand process fDtg and the risk selection policy fatg. We
assume that the outside option for patients who do not visit a surgeon yields an expected payo of
0.
Suppose  = G. We assume that h(1;G) > 0 so that even when a good surgeon is engaging in
maximal selection behavior, visiting the good surgeon has positive expected patient payo. Therefore,
when  = G, the rst-best outcome for patient welfare is Dt = 1 and at = 0 for all t.
Now suppose  = B. The rst-best outcome depends on the sign of h(1;B):
 When h(1;B) > 0, in expectation it is preferred for patients to visit a bad surgeon who is
selecting against risky patients than not to visit him at all. So the rst-best outcome is Dt = 1
and at = 1 for all t.
 When h(1;B) < 0, in expectation it is preferred for patients to take the outside option (payo
0) than to see a bad surgeon even when he is selecting risk. So conditional on  = B, patients
never want to visit a bad surgeon. The rst-best outcome then is for Dt = 0 for all t (making
at irrelevant for welfare).
3.3 Tradeos
To preface the technical analysis that follows, we rst provide some intuition about the tradeos we
are balancing. The Revelation Principle tells us that we can restrict attention to truth-telling pairs
of contracts. It will turn out that the contract for the bad type can be computed without concern for
the good surgeon's self-selection constraint because the good surgeon will not be tempted to identify
13himself as bad. As a result, we are easily able to characterize the contract for the bad surgeon using
existing techniques.
The contract for the good type is more dicult to compute because we must be wary of the bad
surgeon wanting to deviate and identify himself as good. Thus there are tradeos that need to be
carefully balanced in the good contract. We can separate welfare eects into current period eects
and future period eects. In the current period, we can increase patient welfare by having the good
surgeon treat all patients. However, that gain is oset by making it easier for the bad surgeon to
imitate the good surgeon and hence more dicult to separate the two types in the future. On the
other hand, we can take a loss in patient welfare in the current period by having the good surgeon
select against risky patients. That current period loss is oset by making it easier to distinguish
good types from bad types in the future.
3.4 The Principal's Problem
The principal wants to specify a menu of evaluation contracts (CG;CB) that maximizes patient
welfare. Recall that CG consists of an Xt-measurable stopping time G, a recommended action
strategy AG = faG
t g for the good surgeon, and (for convenience) an optimal action strategy ^ AB =
f^ aB
t g for the bad surgeon. CB is similar. Denote CG = fG;AG; ^ ABg and CB = fB;AB; ^ AGg.
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:
Associated with each contract C is an expected payo W to its intended recipient. Hence (WG;WB)
denotes the pair of values associated with a menu of evaluation contracts.
Remark: Notice that in the principal's problem there is no participation constraint for either the
principal or the surgeon. For the surgeon, he does not have the option of avoiding the principal and
rejecting both contracts. The menu of contracts is compulsory. For the principal, since the surgeries
will take place regardless, she must at least weakly prefer to oer some menu of contracts.
Remark: Let us summarize the key dierences between the good surgeon and the bad surgeon:
(1) although both surgeons improve their performance through selection behavior, which is costly,
the bad surgeon experiences higher marginal performance gain than the good surgeon; (2) the bad
surgeon's payos may be aected dierently by selection behavior than those of the good surgeon,
whose interests are completely aligned with patient welfare; and (3) selection behavior by the bad
surgeon improves expected patient welfare, while selection behavior by the good surgeon reduces
expected patient welfare.
Remark: We have chosen not to include costs in our objective function. We argue that a patient
who needs surgery will inevitably receive some sort of costly treatment, whether it be from a surgeon
in our model who accepts the patient's case or from an outside option. If we assume the costs of all
such treatments are equal, then maximizing patient welfare is simply a matter of optimal assignment
of treatment based on patient welfare, which is the focus of our model. It has been noted that related
literature on this topic has largely neglected to assess the impact of report cards on costs, and our
model follows in that vein (Dranove, Kessler, McClellan & Satterthwaite 2003).
12These are simply incentive compatibility constraints.
154 The Optimal Menu of Evaluation Contracts
Observe that we can solve for each evaluation contract separately. Since the good surgeon chooses
CG and the bad surgeon chooses CB, each contract is optimal conditional on its associated type.
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 ^ WB; (C-GOOD)
and faG
t g, f^ aB
t g are feasible and incentive compatible, where WG
0 is the good surgeon's expected
payo and ^ WB is the bad surgeon's maximum payo (the self-selection constraint).






























t ;G)dt j  = G
#
 ^ WG; (C-BAD)
and faB
t g, f^ aG
t g are feasible and incentive compatible, where WB
0 is the bad surgeon's expected
payo and ^ WG is the good surgeon's maximum payo (the self-selection constraint).
It turns out that in an optimal evaluation contract, each surgeon's continuation value evolves as
a state variable, whose initial value is equal to the surgeon's total expected (average) payo from
the contract at time 0. Notice that each continuation value must fall between 0, the surgeon's
continuation value after license revocation, and 1, the (normalized) maximal 
ow payo. If the
surgeon's continuation value ever reaches 1, this means that the principal can no longer cut o the
surgeon. In other words, the surgeon achieves tenure. Note that the contract in which the principal
completely ignores the surgeon's signal history corresponds to the pair of values (WG;WB) = (1;1).
16We characterize each contract separately. We begin by deriving the easier contract, the contract
for the bad type, and then continue by tackling the contract for the good type. The solution to the
good contract is where we introduce novel techniques. After nding those two evaluation contracts,
we take the last step of choosing specic values for the contracts such that total expected patient
welfare is maximized and the self-selection constraints hold.
4.1 Optimal Evaluation Contract for the Bad Surgeon
The optimal evaluation contract for the bad surgeon solves the optimization problem (C-BAD). The
last constraint re
ects the self-selection constraint, and we proceed by ignoring it (claiming it is not
binding), solving the maximization problem, and afterwards verifying that the constraint holds in
the optimal solution.
Without the self-selection constraint, the optimization problem is very similar to the continuous-
time principal-agent problem solved in Sannikov (2007b) and we follow his techniques directly. In
this section, we derive the contract informally, leaving the formal proofs to Appendix A.1.3.
Notice that we allow for arbitrarily complex history-dependent contracts. The key simplifying
insight from Sannikov (2007b), which also holds in discrete time (Spear & Srivastava 1987), is that the
agent's continuation value Wt at a given time t completely summarizes the past history in an optimal
contract. Replacing one continuation contract (following some history) with another continuation
contract that has the same continuation value Wt does not change the agent's incentives. After
any history then, the principal's payo is maximized if and only if the continuation contract is
optimal given the continuation value. Therefore, Wt completely determines the optimal continuation
contract. Recalling Denition 1 of a scoring rule, we can think of Wt as the contract's score.
Let AB = faB
t g be the action policy for the bad surgeon specied by the contract. Then his
continuation value at time t is
WB









denotes the expectation under the probability measure PAB
induced by the bad surgeon's
strategy AB. For the remainder of this section, we drop the B notation, unless necessary to avoid
confusion. From Proposition 1 of Sannikov (2007b), we know that we can represent Wt(AB) as a
17diusion process: there exists a progressively measurable process Y = fYtg such that13
dWt(A) = r(Wt(A)   g(at;B))dt + rYtdZA
t 8t  0; (4.1)
where dZA
t = dXt  (at;B)dt. We call Yt the sensitivity of the process to the signals Xt, where Yt
(scaled by r) re
ects the volatility of Wt(A). Now, how do we determine whether A is incentive com-
patible? For a given strategy A, consider the process Y = fYtg such that (4.1) holds. Proposition 2 of
Sannikov (2007b) tells us that A is optimal if and only if at 2 argmaxa02A g(a0;B)+Yt(a0;B) 8t  0
holds almost everywhere. In other words, for the specic process Y associated with a given strategy
A, we can summarize incentive-compatible actions at as a function of Yt:
at(Yt) = 1 =) Yt 
B
kB and at(Yt) = 0 =) Yt 
B
kB: (4.2)
This is intuitive: the surgeon optimally engaging in selection behavior corresponds to the score being
highly sensitive to signals. Similarly, the surgeon optimally avoiding selection behavior corresponds
to the score being less sensitive to signals.
To nd the optimal contract that solves (C-BAD), we rst use the representation of the surgeon's
payo as a diusion process to apply dynamic programming principles and write out the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. We solve the HJB equation and then verify that the solution in
fact characterizes an optimal contract.
Let (W) denote the maximum payo to the principal when the bad surgeon gets continuation
payo W. The principal provides incentives by using realized signals to adjust W. Formally, the
surgeon's payo evolves according to:
dWt = r(Wt   g(at;B))dt + rYtdZt (4.3)
where fatg is the surgeon's optimal risk selection strategy and fYtg is a progressively measurable
process (with respect to the signal process fXtg).14 By Ito's Lemma, we can write the law of motion







s ds] < 1
for all t 2 [0;1).









dt + 0(W)rY dZ:
Then, the HJB equation is
(W) = max
a;Y




Let a(W) and Y (W) denote the action and sensitivity arguments that serve as maximizers on the
right hand side for a given W. We impose the constraint that a(W) = a(Y (W)) (from (4.2)). So in
fact, we can rewrite the HJB equation in a more convenient form, and with boundary conditions, as
00(W) = min
Y
(W)   h(a(Y );B)   0(W)(W   g(a(Y );B))
r2Y 2=2
where (0) = 0 and (1) = h(0;B): (HJB-BAD)
Notice that if 00(W) < 0, then the minimizing choice of Y in the HJB equation will be the minimum
sensitivity needed to enforce action a(W).
Without loss of generality, we normalize h(a;B) so that h(1;B) = 1. First, we state a brief
lemma, proved in Appendix A.1.1:
Lemma 2. The solution  to (HJB-BAD) is unique and strictly concave.
Solving (HJB-BAD) gives us the function (W), as well as the functions a(W) and Y (W) that
serve as minimizers on the RHS of the HJB equation. More formally, we denote the solution to
(HJB-BAD) as (;a;Y ) where  : [0;1] ! [h(0;B);1], a : [0;1] ! A and Y : [0;1] ! [0;1). First
we will show how to construct a corresponding evaluation contract CB from that solution, and then
we conrm that CB is indeed optimal.
Denote the evaluation contract corresponding to the solution to (HJB-BAD) by CB = fB;ABg,
where B is the Xt-measurable stopping time and AB = faB
t g is the recommended incentive-
compatible risk selection policy for the bad surgeon. We conjecture that CB is optimal and construct
it as follows. Let the bad surgeon's continuation value at time t be Wt, which starts at an initially
19chosen W0 and evolves according to
dWt = r(Wt   g(aB
t ;B))dt + rYtdZt:
Set aB
t = a(Wt) and Yt = Y (Wt), which we know enforces incentive compatibility of a(Wt). Finally,
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We show that at any time t, Wt is the expected continuation payo to the bad surgeon from this
contract and (Wt) is the expected continuation patient welfare.
Proposition 1 establishes that the above evaluation contract constructed from the solution to
(HJB-BAD) is in fact optimal.
Proposition 1. The contract constructed from the unique solution (;a;Y ) to (HJB-BAD) charac-
terizes an optimal evaluation contract for the bad surgeon CB that solves (C-BAD). This evaluation
contract takes the form of a scoring rule in which the score is the bad surgeon's continuation value
Wt. The initial score W0 corresponds to the bad surgeon's expected payo from the entire contract,
and (W0) corresponds to the expected patient welfare from the entire contract.
When the score is Wt, the expected continuation patient welfare is (Wt), the sensitivity of the
score to signals is Y (Wt) and the optimal selection policy is a(Wt). Also, Y (Wt) > 0 for all Wt 2
(0;1) and hence the score hits 0 or 1 in nite time. If the score hits 0 before it hits 1, the surgeon's
license is revoked; if the score hits 1 before it hits 0, the surgeon is awarded tenure.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.3.
Broadly, the optimal evaluation contract is a scoring rule in which the evolution of the score is
governed by the sensitivity rule Y (W). If the surgeon performs too poorly and his score drops below
a threshold, his license is revoked and he is red. On the other hand, if the surgeon performs very
well and his score rises above a threshold, he is awarded tenure. Proposition 2 below tells us that in
an optimal contract the bad surgeon is always incentivized to engage in selection behavior, which is
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Figure 1: For CB { Patient Welfare (W), Score Sensitivity Y (W), Selection Policy a(W)
Proposition 2. In the solution to (HJB-BAD), a(W) = 1 for all W 2 [0;1) and therefore optimally
Y (W) =
B
kB for all W 2 [0;1). In other words, until tenure, the bad surgeon always engages in risk
selection and the contract's sensitivity to outcomes is constant.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.2.
In an optimal bad contract, the result that an untenured bad surgeon always engages in selection
behavior is intuitive. Given that we ignore the good surgeon's self-selection constraint as non-binding,
making an untenured bad surgeon engage in selection behavior by increasing the score sensitivity
improves patient welfare under the bad contract without causing value to be destroyed under the
good contract.
The main features of the scoring rule are depicted in Figure 1. On the left panel is patient welfare
as a function of the score W. Notice that patient welfare is bounded by the triangle formed by the
feasible set of bad surgeon-patient welfare pairs (0;0), (g(1;B);h(1;B)), and (g(0;B);h(0;B)). Also
plotted as a function of the score, the right panel presents the score sensitivity rule and the bad
surgeon's optimal selection policy, both of which we have shown to be constant.
Comparative Statics. How does the optimal contract for the bad type change as we vary the
underlying parameters? The shape of the optimal contract depends on the technology parameter
kB, the cost of risk selection B, the interest rate r, the signal volatility , and the patient welfare
function h(a;B). As kB, the dierence between the drift of the bad surgeon's signal when he selects

















Figure 2: For CB { Changes in (W) as kB, B vary (for xed r;;g;h)
principal can be and the higher his maximal payo for a given W. In other words,  becomes more
concave (i.e. 0(0) !
h(1;B)
g(1;B)). On the other hand, as kB decreases,  becomes less concave (i.e.
0(0) !  h(0;B)) and the principal's payo decreases. See the left panel of Figure 2. Note that
holding kB xed and decreasing r2 has the same eect as holding r2 xed and increasing kB.
Now consider if we increase B, the cost of risk selection. There are two eects. First, the
minimum sensitivity
B
kB needed to enforce action at = 1 increases, which decreases the concavity
of . Secondly, the bad surgeon's payo when he engages in selection behavior, g(1;B), decreases.
Hence, for the region to the right of the maximum , patient welfare decreases. See the right panel
of Figure 2.
Finally, consider what happens as the values of h(a;B) change. This alters the size and position of
the triangle that bounds the optimal contract . As expected, as either h(1;B) or h(0;B) increases,
patient welfare in the optimal contract  for a given W also increases.
We still need to verify that the good surgeon's self-selection constraint is in fact not binding. The
verication is simpler after we derive the optimal contract for the good surgeon, which we do in
the following section. At the end of that section we conrm that the good surgeon's self-selection
constraint holds.
The techniques we have used to solve for the bad surgeon's optimal contract are directly analogous
to those developed in Sannikov (2007b). In the following section, we solve for the good surgeon's
optimal contract. Because we cannot ignore the self-selection constraint, the problem becomes much
more complex. To solve it, we adopt novel applications of continuous-time techniques.
225 Optimal Evaluation Contract for the Good Surgeon
The optimal evaluation contract for the good surgeon solves the optimization problem (C-GOOD).
Unlike solving for the bad contract, we cannot ignore the self-selection constraint in this problem
because it will be binding. Therefore, we must keep track of two state variables { both the continu-
ation payo to the good surgeon and the continuation payo to the bad surgeon. Furthermore, the
principal's payo (i.e. patient welfare) will be a function of both continuation values. In this section,
we provide an informal derivation of the optimal contract, and we perform most formal verications
in Appendix A.2.
Let AG = faG
t g be the good surgeon's optimal risk selection policy, and AB = faB
t g be the bad
surgeon's optimal risk selection policy.15 Their respective continuation values in the contract at time
t are
WG


















denotes the expectation under the probability measure PA
induced by the type- sur-
geon's strategy A. Again, by Proposition 1 of Sannikov (2007b) we can represent WG
t (AG) and
WB
t (AB) as diusion processes so that there exist progressively measurable processes YG = fY G
t g
and YB = fY B
t g such that16
dWG
t (AG) = r(WG
t (AG)   g(aG
t ;G))dt + rY G
t dZAG
t 8t  0; (5.1)
dWB
t (AB) = r(WB
t (AB)   g(aB
t ;B))dt + rY B
t dZAB
t 8t  0: (5.2)
As before, we call Y 
t the sensitivity of the process to the signals Xt, from the perspective of the
type- surgeon. Lemma 10, proven in Appendix A.2.1, gives the incentive compatibility conditions
for AG and AB (and the corresponding sensitivity processes YG and YB):
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t (Y G









15We have dropped the hat over ^ A
B = f^ a
B
t g and will continue to do so in this section.
16Again, to be precise, Proposition 1 of Sannikov (2007b) also tells us that the processes Y









2ds] < 1 for all t 2 [0;1).
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So for each type of surgeon, there exists a threshold sensitivity above which he engages in selection
behavior and below which he does not.
To nd the optimal contract that solves (C-GOOD), we attempt a similar approach as before.
First we use the representation of the surgeons' payos as diusion processes so that we can apply
dynamic programming principles to nd the relevant Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. We
solve the HJB equation and then show that the solution in fact characterizes an optimal contract.
Let (WG
t ;WB
t ) denote the maximum expected payo to the principal (i.e. patient welfare) when
the good surgeon gets continuation payo WG
t and the bad surgeon gets continuation payo WB
t .














t = dXt (aG;G)dt and dZB
t = dXt (aB;B)dt, so that dZB
t = dZG
t +((aG;G) 




t ;B) + Y B
t ((aG
t ;G)   (aB
t ;B)))dt + rY B
t dZG
t :
So the drift of the bad surgeon's continuation value from the principal's perspective involves a
correction term, which includes the bad surgeon's perceived sensitivity. We apply Ito's Lemma to
arrive at the law of motion for (WG
t ;WB
t ). It follows that the HJB equation is
(WG
t ;WB
t ) = max


















r2(Y B)2 + 12(WG
t ;WB
t )r2Y GY B:
Analyzing that equation is unwieldy. Fortunately, recall that we have assumed that good surgeons are
fully altruistic. So, h(a;G) / g(a;G) and the good surgeon makes risk selection decisions completely
in the interests of patients. A contract that maximizes the good surgeon's payo also maximizes
patient welfare. So we can re-write the optimization problem (C-GOOD) with the good surgeon's




















t ;B)dt j  = B
#
 ^ WB; (5.5)
and faG
t g, faB
t g are feasible and incentive compatible, where ^ WB is the maximum allowable payo
to the bad surgeon.
It follows that (WG
t ;WB
t ) / WG
t , so we can write patient welfare as a function of WB
t only, i.e.
(WB
t ). Without loss of generality, we normalize that constant of proportionality to be 1, so that
(WB
t ) = WG
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and the volatility is r0(WB
t )Y B
t . We can match up terms with the law of motion for WG
t to obtain
useful formulas characterizing the relationship between WG
t and WB






which describes the relationship between the score sensitivity from the good surgeon's perspective
Y G
t and the score sensitivity from the bad surgeon's perspective Y B
t . When 0(WB
t ) is large (i.e. the
good surgeon has a lot to gain from a score increase), the score sensitivity from the good surgeon's
perspective is higher than the score sensitivity from the bad surgeon's perspective. The opposite
holds when 0(WB
t ) is small.
The HJB equation that selects aG, aB, and Y (we drop the B superscript) to maximize the good
surgeon's payo (WB) is as follows:
(WB) = max
aG;aB;Y




Let aG(WB), aB(WB) and Y (WB) denote the action and sensitivity policies that serve as maximizers
on the right hand side of the HJB equation for a given WB. We impose the constraint that aG(WB)
and aB(WB) have to be optimal actions given Y (WB), i.e. aG(WB) = aG(0(W)Y (WB)) and
25aB(WB) = aB(Y (WB)) (from 5.3). Thus, there is a mapping from Y to incentive-compatible pairs
(aG;aB), and in fact we are maximizing over Y in the HJB equation. More conveniently, the HJB
equation can be written
00(WB) = minY
(WB) g(aG(Y );G) 0(WB)(WB g(aB(Y );B)+Y ((aG(Y );G) (aB(Y );B)))
r2Y 2=2
where (0) = 0 and (1) = 1: (HJB-GOOD)
Additionally, we require aG(Y ) = 1 only if Y 
G
0(WB)kG and aG(Y ) = 0 only if Y 
G
0(WB)kG,
while aB(Y ) = 1 only if Y 
B
kB and aB(Y ) = 0 only if Y 
B
kB. The following lemma is proved in
Appendix A.2.2.
Lemma 3. The solution  to (HJB-GOOD) is unique, strictly concave and strictly increasing.
At this point it is instructive to highlight one major dierence between this contracting problem
for the good surgeon and the contracting problem solved in Sannikov (2007b). In the latter problem,
the sensitivity Y appears in the HJB equation only once in the denominator. As a result, the
sensitivity that minimizes the right hand side of the HJB equation is always the minimum sensitivity
needed to enforce a given action. In our problem, however, the sensitivity Y appears both in the
numerator as well as the denominator. As a result, the Y that minimizes the right hand side of the
HJB equation for a given action is not necessarily the minimum sensitivity that enforces that action.
Suppose we solve the HJB equation (HJB-GOOD) and generate the solutions (WB), aG(WB),
aB(WB) and Y (WB). More formally, we denote the solution to (HJB-GOOD) as (;aG;aB;Y )
where  : [0;1] ! [0;1], aG : [0;1] ! A, aB : [0;1] ! A and Y : [0;1] ! [0;1).
We construct a corresponding evaluation contract as follows, conjecturing that it solves (C-
GOOD). Denote the contract by CG = fG;AG;ABg, where G is an Xt-measurable stopping
time, AG = faG
t g is the recommended incentive-compatible risk selection policy for the good sur-
geon, and AB = faB
t g is the optimal risk selection policy for the bad surgeon (if he were to deviate
and take this contract). Let the deviating bad surgeon's continuation value be WB
t , which starts at
an initially chosen WB
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t ) and aG
t = aG(WB
t ). We also set Yt = Y (Wt), which we know enforces incentive
compatibility of aB(WB
t ) and aG(WB
t ). Finally, dene the stopping time G as follows. Dene
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We show that at any time t, WB
t is the expected continuation payo to the deviating bad surgeon
from this contract and (Wt) is the expected continuation patient welfare (which is also equal to
the good surgeon's continuation value).
Proposition 3 establishes that the above evaluation contract constructed from the solution to
(HJB-GOOD) is in fact optimal.
Proposition 3. The contract constructed from the unique solution (;aG;aB;Y ) to (HJB-GOOD)
characterizes an optimal evaluation contract for the good surgeon CG that solves (C-GOOD). This
evaluation contract takes the form of a scoring rule in which the score is the bad surgeon's continuation
value Wt. The initial score W0 corresponds to the deviating bad surgeon's expected payo from the
entire contract if he chooses it, and (W0) corresponds to the expected patient welfare (and hence
the good surgeon's expected payo) from the entire contract.
Suppose the score is Wt. Then the expected continuation patient welfare is (Wt). From the
good surgeon's perspective, the sensitivity of the score to signals is 0(Wt)Y (Wt) and the optimal
risk selection policy is aG(Wt). From the bad surgeon's perspective, if he has deviated and accepted
CG, the sensitivity of the score to signals is Y (Wt) and the optimal risk selection policy is aB(Wt).
Furthermore, Y (Wt) > 0 for all Wt 2 (0;1) and hence the score Wt hits 0 or 1 in nite time. If the
score hits 0 before it hits 1, we know (Wt) = 0 and hence the surgeon's license is revoked. If the
score hits 1 before it hits 0, we know (Wt) = 1 and hence the surgeon is awarded tenure.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.3 for proof.
We now highlight the second major diculty that arises when solving this contracting problem for
27the good surgeon but does not arise when solving the contracting problem for the bad surgeon (i.e.
the problem solved in Sannikov (2007b)). Recall that in the case of the bad surgeon, we appeal to a
simplifying insight that we can replace one continuation contract with another continuation contract
without changing the agent's incentives, so long as both contracts have the same continuation value to
the agent. Therefore, we know that any continuation contract in the bad surgeon's optimal contract
is itself optimal and hence on the curve .
In this case of the good surgeon, however, we are managing the incentives of two agents. If the
continuation contract for a given continuation value Wt achieves a lower patient welfare than the
optimal contract for that value Wt, then we cannot simply replace the rst contract by the second
one. The reason is that doing so will alter the incentives of the good surgeon. In order to show
that at any point in time the continuation contract in the optimal contract achieves a continuation
patient welfare that lies on the curve , we must appeal to a more complex argument. We do so in
Lemma 16 of the Appendix.
We have now fully characterized an optimal evaluation contract for the good surgeon by an HJB
equation. In the next section, we analyze properties of the contract.
5.1 Properties of the Good Surgeon's Evaluation Contract
We characterize both the optimal risk selection policy for the good surgeon aG(W) and the optimal
risk selection policy for the deviating bad surgeon aB(W). Clearly, the good surgeon's policy is of
greater interest than the bad surgeon's, since under the optimal menu of contracts only the good
surgeon is assigned to the good contract. Nonetheless, characterizing both policies gives a more
complete picture that is helpful in understanding the incentives the good surgeon faces.
Consider the good surgeon. We nd that his optimal risk selection policy takes the shape of a
weakly decreasing step function. We also nd that the sensitivity of the score to signals from the
good surgeon's perspective is strictly decreasing in W. Thus, when the score is low, the contract is
highly sensitive to signals and the good surgeon optimally engages in selection behavior; meanwhile,
when the score is high, the contract is less sensitive to signals and the good surgeon optimally stops
selecting risk. Notice that the good surgeon selects risk even in our case when he is fully altruistic
and aligns his interests directly with patients. We discuss this in further detail below.
The score at which the good surgeon switches from selecting risk to not selecting risk corresponds
28generically to a discontinuous downward jump in the sensitivity. Thus, there are two distinct regions:
a \hot seat" region of high sensitivity in which the good surgeon's score is low, the scoring rule is
stricter, and his performance is scrutinized more carefully; and a \benet of the doubt" region of
low sensitivity in which the good surgeon's score is higher, the scoring rule is more lenient, and
his performance is scrutinized less carefully. Interestingly, the optimal risk selection policy for the
deviating bad surgeon turns out also to take the form of a weakly decreasing step function.
We summarize the results in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. In an optimal evaluation contract for the good surgeon characterized by Proposition
3, both the recommended risk selection policy for the good surgeon and the optimal risk selection policy
for the deviating bad surgeon are weakly decreasing step functions: as the score increases, both types
of surgeon (weakly) reduce their selection behavior. Furthermore, in this contract the score sensitivity
from the good surgeon's perspective 0(W)Y (W) is strictly decreasing. At the score W0 where the
good surgeon switches from engaging in selection behavior to avoiding selection behavior, Y (W0) (and
hence 0(W0)Y (W0)) generically features a discontinuous jump, separating the low-score region with
high score sensitivity (the \hot seat") from the high-score region with low score sensitivity (\benet
of the doubt").
Proof. See Appendix A.3.1 for proof.
Although weakly decreasing functions admit the possibility of the optimal policies being constant
before tenure, it turns out that neither surgeon optimally selects risk over the entire range of scores.
Proposition 5. In an optimal evaluation contract for the good surgeon characterized by Proposition
3, there always exists an  > 0 such that for high enough scores W 2 (1 ;1], both the good surgeon
and the deviating bad surgeon optimally avoid selection behavior.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.1 for proof.
To summarize, the good surgeon's contract takes the form of a scoring rule where the score is
the state variable W (i.e. the deviating bad surgeon's continuation value). The score evolves in
accordance with the rule Y B(W) = Y (W), which re
ects the sensitivity of the score to realizations
of the surgeons' signals. From the perspective of the good surgeon, the sensitivity of the score is
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Figure 3: For CG { Patient Welfare ; Sensitivity and Selection Policies Y G, aG; Sensitivity and
Selection Policies Y B, aB
are likely to engage in risk selection. A low sensitivity indicates the scoring rule is \lenient" and
hence surgeons are likely to avoid selection. Implementation of the good surgeon's scoring rule
then typically involves four regions: a \hot seat" region in which the good surgeon's performance is
judged strictly and thus he selects risk; a \benet of the doubt" region in which his performance is
judged leniently and hence he avoids selection; a license revocation region when his score falls too
low and play terminates; and nally a point of tenure at which his payos are xed at the maximum
regardless of performance. Movement between regions depends on the good surgeon's signals, with
a well-performing surgeon typically moving away from the strict region towards the lenient region
and nally to the point of tenure.
In Figure 3, we depict the main features of the good surgeon's optimal scoring rule CG. In the
left panel, patient welfare is plotted as a strictly increasing, strictly concave function of the score.
In the middle panel is the scoring rule from the perspective of the good surgeon, who is expected
to select this scoring rule. Notice that the score sensitivity from the good surgeon's perspective is
weakly decreasing, and that there is a jump downward separating the region of high sensitivity from
the region of low sensitivity. In the right panel we also include the scoring rule from the perspective
of the bad surgeon if he were to deviate and select this scoring rule. Note that the score sensitivity
is not necessarily monotonic from the bad surgeon's perspective.
We can look at the shape of the contract to consider the tradeos between current period gains
and future period gains. When the score is low, the good surgeon engages in risk selection because
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Figure 4: Illustration of Current Period versus Future Period Tradeos
order to more easily separate from the bad surgeon in the future. This corresponds to region A in
Figure 4. In region B, even though the bad surgeon is still selecting risk to in
ate his performance,
the good surgeon stops selecting risk, choosing to take the current period gain rather than work to
separate himself from the deviating bad surgeon. Finally, in region C, the bad surgeon is no longer
willing to engage in costly selection behavior, and the good surgeon can avoid selection altogether,
capturing current period gains while still being able to separate himself.
Comparative Statics. We brie
y give some intuition behind what happens as we change the
values of the underlying parameters in the optimal good contract. In particular, we are interested
in what happens (a) as G, the good surgeon's cost of selection, changes, (b) as kG, the eectiveness
of screening for the good surgeon changes, (c) as (0;G)   (0;B), the dierence between the two
surgeons' technologies, changes, and (d) as r, the interest rate, or 2, the square of the signal
volatility, changes.17
As G increases, the eect moves in two ways. First, patient welfare increases because the good
surgeon engages in less selection behavior; however, this allows the bad surgeon to derive more value
from deviating to the good contract and hence we must give him more value in the bad contract,
decreasing patient welfare. Furthermore, patients suer more harm when the good surgeon selects
risk.
Given an increase in kG, patient welfare increases because the good surgeon engaging in selection
17Note that holding all parameters for the good type constant and then adjusting parameters for the bad type also
changes the optimal contract, but we choose not to focus on those here as such changes would also change the shape
of the optimal bad contract.
31becomes more eective in separating himself. Similarly, as (0;G) (0;B) increases, again patients
benet because the good surgeon can identify himself more easily. Finally, as r or  increases, the
signal eectively becomes less informative and therefore patient welfare decreases.
5.2 Verifying Self-Selection Constraint
We still need to verify that the good surgeon's self-selection constraint is not binding. Suppose it
were. Then CB would give the bad surgeon a payo of WB and the good surgeon a payo of WG
where WG > (WB). This would then violate our claim that CG is the optimal contract that
maximizes the good surgeon's payo for a given payo of the bad surgeon. Therefore, we conclude
that the good surgeon's self-selection constraint must not be binding.
6 Finding the Optimal Menu of Evaluation Contracts
Now that we have characterized the optimal contract for the good surgeon and the optimal contract
for the bad surgeon, the last step is for the principal to choose appropriate initial conditions for the
pair of contracts so as to maximize total discounted expected patient welfare.
Recall that for an optimal bad contract CB, expected patient welfare is ( ~ WB
0 ) when the expected
payo to the bad surgeon is ~ WB
0 . On the other hand, for an optimal good contract CG, expected
patient welfare is (  WB
0 ) when the expected payo to the bad surgeon is  WB
0 . In order for the bad
surgeon's self-selection constraint to hold, the initial conditions of the contracts must be chosen such
that ~ WB
0   WB
0 .
So the principal wants to choose initial scores  WB
0 ; ~ WB
0 for the optimal good and optimal bad
contracts respectively, such that the principal solves max  WB
0 ; ~ WB
0 p(  WB
0 ) + (1   p)( ~ WB
0 ) subject
to ~ WB
0   WB
0 . Since (  WB
0 ) is weakly increasing in its argument, the solution always involves
~ WB
0 =  WB





0 ) + (1   p)(WB
0 );
which is maximized when
















Figure 5: Optimal initial score W for optimal menu of scoring rules (CG;CB)
See Figure 5. Notice that the optimal W always occurs to the right of the score for which (W)
is maximized. Therefore, if 0(0) > 0, then it is never optimal to re both surgeons immediately.
On the other hand, if the proportion of good surgeons p in the population is large enough, or if the
expected patient welfare from a bad surgeon taking all cases is not too low, then it may be optimal
to avoid evaluation contracts altogether (i.e. tenure all surgeons immediately).
Notice that when W is in the region of high sensitivity, this suggests that any surgeon in the
good contract starts out in a \hot seat." Immediately, his performance is scrutinized carefully and
his outcomes carry a heavy weight. Only when the surgeon has proven himself and pushed his score
past the threshold into the region of low sensitivity does he get a break. On the other hand, when
W is in the region of low sensitivity, all surgeons start out in the \benet of the doubt" region of
the good contract. It is only when a surgeon has experienced some poor performance and his score
drops into the high sensitivity region that his performance is scrutinized carefully.
Remark: As Ely and V alim aki mention in their analysis (2003), there are two issues with separating
contracts. First, conditional on the good type, the contract is not renegotiation-proof. The good
surgeon and the principal would like to renegotiate and tenure the surgeon immediately once he has
33been identied as good. We assume that there is no renegotiation. Secondly, conditional on the bad
type, it may not be sequentially rational for the principal to follow through with the contract. It is
never sequentially rational if h(1;B) < 0. For now we assume that the principal can commit to the
bad contract, but in Section 8 we revisit the issue.
Comparative Statics. How does the choice of W change as we adjust the values of the underlying
parameters?
First, let's look at p, the ex ante probability that the surgeon is of the good type. As p increases,
the ratio at the optimal W of
 0(W
0(W) increases as well. Hence the optimal W increases in p, as
does expected patient welfare. Another way to think about this is that as the proportion of good
surgeons p increases, the good surgeon is more likely to begin with the benet of the doubt (i.e. in
the lenient scoring region) than to begin in the hot seat (i.e. in the strict scoring region).
To look at comparative statics of other underlying parameters, we have to turn attention to how
such changes aect the optimal evaluation contracts CG and CB themselves. Generally, all else
equal, the more concave the function (W) in CG, the smaller W is and the higher the patient
welfare achieved. Similarly, all else equal, the more concave the function (W) in CB, again the
smaller W is and the higher the patient welfare achieved. Since any change in parameters involves
several moving parts, we best illustrate comparative statics through numerical examples presented
in the following section.
7 Numerical Examples
To illustrate some comparative statics, we look at several numerical examples and compute optimal
contracts.
In Example 1, we consider the base case of equal costs of selection and overlap in surgeons'
technologies. Example 2 adjusts the bad surgeon's technology so that there is no longer overlap.
In Example 3, we return to the base case of Example 1 but make the cost of selection for the bad
surgeon high relative to the good surgeon. Finally, in Example 4, we amend the base case so that
the eectiveness of selection for the good surgeon, kG, is close to that of the bad surgeon, kB.
34Example 1. Suppose that both the bad surgeon and the good surgeon experience the same cost
of selection, i.e.  = G = B, and that the bad surgeon's marginal performance gain from selection
is twice the good surgeon's marginal performance gain, so kB = 2kG. Furthermore, there is overlap
between the two surgeon's technologies, so that (0;G) < (1;B). Figure 7 summarizes the optimal
menu of contracts with such a setup. In the top panel, we have an analog of Figure 5, in which patient
welfare is plotted against the score in both CG and CB. In the bottom panels, we have analogs of
the middle and right panels of Figure 3 for the good contract: from each surgeon's perspective, the
score sensitivity and the optimal selection policy are plotted against the score.
As expected, expected patient welfare (W) is strictly increasing and concave in the score. Fur-
thermore, the optimal selection policies of both surgeons take the form of weakly decreasing step
functions. The bottom row of plots is particularly interesting: these two plots represent the score
sensitivity to signals from each surgeon's perspective. Recall that Y G(W), the score sensitivity for
the good surgeon, is equal to 0(W)Y B(W). There are four regions in the evaluation contract:
1. W = 0, which re
ects license revocation,
2. W 2 [0; 0:2), which re
ects the region of high score sensitivity,
3. W 2 [ 0:2;1), which re
ects the region of low score sensitivity, and
4. W = 1, which re
ects tenure.
When p = 0:5, the optimal W at which scores are initialized is around 0.64, so that good surgeons
begin in the region of low score sensitivity. Dene the ineciency of an outcome as a measure of the
distance from rst-best welfare. Relative to having no contracts, the optimal contracts in this base
case example eliminates 42% of the ineciency.
One might imagine that overlap in the two surgeons' technologies is essential in generating regions
where the good surgeon engages in selection. However, even if the technologies do not overlap,
the optimal evaluation contract for the good surgeon looks quite similar, although patient welfare
increases. Consider Example 2.
Example 2. Suppose that the surgeons continue to experience the same common cost of selection
and the same dierence in marginal performance gains from selection. However, there is no longer
35overlap between the two technologies, so (0;G) > (1;B). Figure 8 summarizes the optimal menu
of evaluation contracts in such a case.
Notice that the downward jump in score sensitivities gets smaller. The intuition is that it is easier
to dierentiate the surgeons, and so the drop in sensitivities need not be as drastic. The optimal W
drops to 0.51 and eliminated eciency relative to no contracts is 64%, which is high relative to the
base case.
The optimal selection policy for the deviating bad surgeon need not always switch from selection
to no selection at a later score than the good surgeon's policy. In fact, if the cost of selection for
the bad surgeon is high enough, he may stop selecting risk before the good surgeon. Consider the
following example.
Example 3. Suppose that the bad surgeon's marginal performance gain is still twice the good
surgeon's marginal performance gain from selection, and there is again overlap between the surgeons'
technologies. But now the bad surgeon's cost of selection is high (while the good surgeon's cost of
selection is low). Then Figure 9 summarizes the optimal good evaluation contract. The optimal W
is 0.58 and eliminated eciency relative to no contracts is a low 21.8%, so introducing contracts is
relatively less helpful than the base case.
If we now remove the overlap from Example 3 and leave the cost of selection for the bad surgeon
high enough relative to the good surgeon, it turns out that the bad surgeon's optimal selection
policy may actually become 
at. At all scores W, the bad surgeon chooses not to engage in selection
behavior. See Example 4.
Example 4. We return to the base case of Example 1 but increase kG so that now kB = 1:1kG.
Figure 10 summarizes the optimal menu of evaluation contracts. Since the eectiveness of selection
for the good surgeon is higher, eectively he is able to separate himself more easily. The optimal W
is 0.61 and eliminated ineciency is 45% relative to no contracts.
8 Possibility of Improvement through Mentorship
Before concluding, we show how our methods can be used to consider a related question. Given that
we have applied the Revelation Principle, our optimal mechanism takes the form of two separating
36contracts, one of which will be chosen by the good surgeon in equilibrium and the other of which will
be chosen by the bad surgeon in equilibrium. In our setup, because we not allow for improvement,
once a surgeon has identied himself as bad, the optimal contract is constructed in order to minimize
his harm.
In practice, however, it is likely that improvement is possible. In particular, if a bad surgeon
performs some volume of surgeries in a mentored setting, i.e. with additional guidance and oversight,
it is conceivable that he can improve to a good type. We observe that it is common for physicians
to undergo a mentored training program (e.g. a fellowship) after which their quality is believed to
improve. Suppose this is the case.
Let's consider the existence of a mentorship program with the following characteristics:
 If the bad surgeon is under mentorship, a patient who visits the bad surgeon receives a higher
payo if the bad surgeon does not engage in selection behavior than if he does engage in
selection behavior, i.e. h(0;B) > h(1;B).
 A surgeon can only go through the mentorship program once.
 A surgeon must complete the entire mentorship program in order to be eligible to practice
surgery in the future. After completing the mentorship program, the surgeon is assigned to the
good contract.
 If the mentorship program is of length at least T > 0, so the bad surgeon has a minimum
level of mentored experience, then the bad surgeon improves to a good surgeon so long as he
invests eort, which is unobservable. Let K be the cumulative cost of eort to the surgeon.18
We show that such a program is optimal. More specically, an optimal contract for the bad surgeon
is a xed-length mentorship program in which (a) the surgeon's outcomes are ignored and (b) the
bad surgeon in equilibrium chooses to exert costly eort to become a good surgeon.
Lemma 4. Suppose h(0;B) > h(1;B). Then the optimal contract CB is as follows: for all W,
(W) = h(0;B)W, a(W) = 0 and Y (W) = 0.
Proof. This follows directly from looking at the optimization problem (C-BAD) when h(a;B) is
decreasing in a and we ignore the good surgeon's self-selection constraint. To maximize patient

















Figure 6: Optimal initial scores when improvement is possible through a training program
welfare for a given payo WB
0 to the bad surgeon, we want him never to engage in selection behavior,
which we can achieve for free (without introducing value-destroying volatility to provide incentives).
For any given starting value W0, this contract has a straightforward description. In each period,
the surgeon's score Wt declines by a deterministic amount, independent of his signal:
dWt = r(Wt   g(at;B))dt:
Therefore, at the end of a xed period of time { which we denote as T(W0) and we observe is
increasing in W0 { the score hits 0 and the contract ends. So an optimal contract with starting
value W0 can be interpreted as a mentorship program of length T(W0). For W0 2 (0;1), T(0) = 0 <
T(W0) < T(1) = 1.
Because the only change has been to the patient welfare function when the surgeon is bad,
construction of the optimal contract for the good type remains the same. To determine the optimal
menu of contracts, the principal chooses an initial score W0(G) for the good contract and a length




p(W0(G)) + (1   p)((W0(B)) + e rT(W0(B))(W0(G)))
s:t: W0(B) + e rT(W0(B))((W0(G))   K)  W0(G);
(W0(G))   K  W0(G) and T(W0(B))  T
where the rst constraint is the bad surgeon's self-selection constraint, the second constraint veries
that it is rational for the bad surgeon to expend K to become a good surgeon, and the third
constraint ensures that the mentorship program is suciently long to be eective. Notice that we
are still bounded away from full eciency under the good contract. Furthermore, since T(1) = 1,
optimally the mentorship program is of nite length.
The self-selection constraint will be binding (else, we could just increase W0(G) and achieve higher
patient welfare). So we essentially maximize over only W0(G), which will imply W0(B) through the
self-selection constraint. Meanwhile, the second and third constraints will restrict W0(G) to an
interior subinterval of [0;1].19 On the one hand, we want ~ W0 to be small so that the bad surgeon
becomes good quickly. On the other hand, we want ~ W0 to be big so that the good contract can
oer a high payo to the good surgeon (without attracting the bad surgeon). See Figure 6 for an
illustration.
Notice that if h(0;B) > 0, then it is sequentially rational for the principal to follow through with
the bad contract even when he knows the surgeon is bad.
9 Discussion
In Dranove et al. (2003), the authors hint at the possibility of improved report card design, claiming
\report cards could be constructive if designed in a way to minimize the incentives and opportunities
for provider selection." This paper takes a step in that direction. Our motivating belief is that
performance reporting in healthcare will always be subject to information asymmetries that enable
gaming. Hence, in this paper we characterize optimal contracts for evaluating experts whose types
are heterogeneous but who can take private actions to manipulate performance. Such contracts
19We assume that K and T
 are not too high so that this subinterval has positive measure.
39maximize patient welfare while minimizing welfare-harming gaming incentives.
We apply the Revelation Principle and focus on menus of separating contracts. An optimal
contract takes the form of a scoring rule. The contract for the bad type is simple, implementing a
xed action so long as the surgeon has not achieved tenure by performing exceptionally well or had
his license revoked by performing poorly. The contract for the good type is the more interesting
one, since its design must take into consideration the incentives of both the good surgeon and
the bad surgeon who deviates. The form of this contract makes intuitive sense. If the surgeon's
performance has been exceptionally high, he achieves tenure and is no longer subject to scoring. If
his performance has been exceptionally low, his license is revoked. In between, the score varies with
performance. In particular, the score sensitivity decreases in past performance: when a surgeon's
past performance has been better, the score sensitivity he faces is lower. Furthermore, there are two
distinct scoring regions: rst, a region of high score sensitivity in which the good surgeon optimally
engages in selection behavior, and secondly, a region of low score sensitivity in which the good surgeon
optimally avoids selection behavior.
Our analysis reveals two features of provider selection that have not been highlighted in the
literature. First, a certain amount of gaming by providers may be inevitable. Even when the good
surgeon makes decisions completely in the interests of patients, in our optimal contract he typically
engages in selection behavior. Secondly, risk selection may in fact be welfare-enhancing. For one
thing, risk selection enables good surgeons to separate themselves from bad surgeons who are trying
to look like good types, thereby beneting future patients. Moreover, patients may be better o
when bad surgeons avoid working on dicult cases.
Finally, we note that this issue of performance reporting in healthcare is closely related to the
issue of pay-for-performance, which considers tying payment to performance, i.e. contracting upon
outcome-contingent transfers. Such contracts may be a fruitful extension of this paper's techniques.
To conclude, we stress that the use of performance measures to identify the quality of experts is
essential. Dicult to avoid, however, is the information asymmetry that enables experts to \game"
the system, particularly in healthcare and in education where market-determined prices are absent.
Such gaming is not always harmful, however, and the real question is a matter of balancing the
appropriate tradeos.
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Figure 7: Example 1 (r2 = 0:5,  = 0:4, G 2 f0:8;1:0g, B 2 f0:5;0:9g, h(;B) 2 f 0:4;0:4g)
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Figure 8: Example 2 (r2 = 0:5,  = 0:4, G 2 f0:8;1:0g, B 2 f0:1;0:5g, h(;B) 2 f 0:4;0:4g)
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Figure 9: Example 3 (r2 = 0:5, G = 0:1, B = 0:8, G 2 f0:8;1:0g, B 2 f0:5;0:9g, h(;B) 2
f 0:4;0:4g)
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Figure 10: Example 4 (r2 = 0:5, G = 0:4, B = 0:4, G 2 f0:8;1:15g, B 2 f0:5;0:9g, h(;B) 2
f 0:4;0:4g)
44A Appendix
A.1 Optimal Contract for the Bad Surgeon
In this section we simplify notation and let g(a) = g(a;B),  = B, and  = B.
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 2
We prove the two results in Lemma 2 separately. Let (W) be a solution to the HJB equation and
its boundary conditions (HJB-BAD).
Lemma 5. (W) is strictly concave for all W 2 [0;1].
Proof. First, we prove that either (W) is concave for all W 2 [0;1], convex for all W 2 [0;1], or a
straight line for all W 2 [0;1]. We do so by showing that if 00(W) = 0 at any point W, then (W)




( ^ W) + 0( ^ W)(W   ^ W)   h(a(Y );B)   0( ^ W)(W   g(a(Y )))
r2Y 2=2
is constant for all W.




Since the denominator is always positive, the sign of 00(0) is determined by the numerator. In order
for 00(0) > 0, it must be that 0(0) > 1
. However, this implies that (W) will reach a point (x;y)
such that x >  and y > 1, which is not feasible. For 00(0) = 0, then 0(W) = 1
 for all W, and the
boundary condition (1) = h(0;B) does not hold generically. So if a(0) = 1, then  must be strictly
concave for all W.




For 00(0) > 0, it must be that 0(0) > h(0;B). However, this will violate the boundary condition
(1) = h(0;B). For 00(0) = 0, then 0(0) = h(0;B), which is consistent with the boundary
conditions, but given that 00(0) < 0 for a(0) = 1, it follows that a(0) = 0 is not a minimizer on the
right hand side of the HJB equation. Therefore a(0) = 1 and  is strictly concave for all W.
Lemma 6. (W) is unique.
Proof. Consider equation (HJB-BAD) with initial conditions (0) = 0 and 0(0) = 0. Since the
RHS of the equation is continuous and dierentiable in WB;(WB) and 0(WB) for WB 2 [0;1],
it follows that solutions exist, are unique, and are continuous in 0. Recall from Lemma 5 that for
0 > 1
, the solution to the HJB equation is convex and the boundary condition (1) = h(0;B) does
not hold because the solution will hit the boundary at W = 1 at too high of a point. It must be
that 0 < 1
. Since  is concave, if 0 < h(0;B), then (1) = h(0;B) also cannot hold because the
solution will hit the boundary at W = 1 at too low of a point. Since the solution is continuous in
0, there must exist some 0 2 (h(0;B); 1
) such that (1) = h(0;B).
45A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. (Proposition 2) Suppose a(W) = 0 for some W 2 [0;1). Then Lemma 5 tells us that 00(W) <
0 so the tangent line at W passes above the point (1;h(0;B)). If the tangent line passes above the
point (1;h(0;B)), then the HJB equation for a(W) = 0, i.e.
00(W) =
(W)   h(0;B)   0(W)(W   1)
r2(Y (W))2=2
implies that 00(W) > 0 (since the numerator is positive), which is a contradiction. To maximize
patient welfare, we want to choose the minimum sensitivity that enforces the optimal action. Hence
Y (W) =
B
kB for all W 2 [0;1).
A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Lemma 5 tells us that the solution to the HJB equation is concave. Proposition 2 tells us that we
can restrict attention to the following HJB equation from (HJB-BAD):
00(W) =




with boundary conditions (0) = 0 and (1) = h(0;B).
First, we show how to construct contracts from a given solution to the HJB equation. We follow the
proof of Proposition 3 from Sannikov (2007b) almost identically. We continue to let g(a) = g(a;B),
 = B, and  = B.
Lemma 7. Consider a solution  of equation (HJB-BAD). Let a : [0;1] ! A and Y : [0;1] ! [0;1)
be the minimizers in (HJB-BAD). For any initial condition W0 2 (0;1) there is a unique weak (in
the sense of probability law weak) solution to the equation
dWt = r(Wt   g(a(Wt)))dt + rY (Wt)(dXt   (a(Wt);B)dt) (A.1)
that species fWtg. The contract CB = (B;A) with A = faB
t g gives the bad surgeon continuation
value Wt at any time t, and is dened by aB
t = a(Wt) and B being the rst time that Wt hits either
0 or 1. CB is incentive-compatible and implies an expected payo of W0 to the bad surgeon and an
expected patient welfare (conditional on  = B) of (W0).
Proof. From Proposition 2, we know that a(Wt) = 1 for all Wt 2 [0;1). Theorem 5.5.15 from
Karatzas and Shreve (1991) tells us that there is a unique, weak (in the sense of probability law
weak) solution to (A.1) because the drift and volatility of Wt are bounded on [0;1], and the volatility
is r





We now show that Wt = Wt(A), where Wt(A) is the surgeon's true continuation value from the
contract (B;A). From the representation (4.1), we can write
d(Wt(A)   Wt) = r(Wt(A)   Wt)dt + r(Yt   Y (Wt))dZA
t =)
Et[Wt+s(A)   Wt+s] = ers(Wt(A)   Wt):
Since Et[Wt+s(A)   Wt+s] must remain bounded because both Wt and Wt(A) are bounded, we
46conclude that Wt = Wt(A) for all t  0. In particular, the surgeon gets W0 = W0(A) from the entire
contract. Note that the contract is incentive compatible because we require a(Wt) = a(Y (Wt)).





By Ito's lemma, the drift of Kt is
re rt







By the HJB equation, the value of this expression is always 0. Therefore, Kt is a bounded martingale,
so E[Kt] = K0 for all t  0. Since K0 = (W0), we conclude that expected patient welfare is
(W0).
Now we show that any incentive compatible contract that gives the bad surgeon a payo of W
achieves patient welfare at most (W). So (W) is the upper bound on patient welfare.
Lemma 8. Consider a solution  of equation (HJB-BAD). Any incentive-compatible contract C =
f;Ag achieves patient welfare at most (W0(A)).
Proof. Given an incentive-compatible contract C = f;Ag, denote the surgeon's continuation value





where fatg = A. By Ito's Lemma, the drift of Kt is
re rt





We just need to show that the drift is non-positive. Consider at = 1 and at = 0.
Suppose at = 1. Then Yt 

kB. Since 00(W)  0, it follows from (HJB-BAD) that the drift of
Kt is non-positive. Now suppose at = 0. Then, the drift of Kt is
re rt

1   (Wt) + 0(Wt)(Wt   ) + r2(Yt)200(Wt)
2

which is strictly negative.
Lemma 9. For any t, when the continuation value to the bad surgeon is Wt, the continuation expected
patient welfare is (Wt). In other words, the optimal contract stays on the curve .
Proof. A short argument veries that the continuation value for patient welfare always stays on
the curve . The key idea, as we have argued in Section 4.1, is that in an optimal contract the
agent's continuation value completely summarizes the past history. Therefore, after any history,
the principal's payo is maximized if and only if the continuation contract is optimal given the
continuation value.
47Consider the optimal contract. Suppose that for some continuation value Wt for the bad surgeon,
the continuation value for patient welfare is ^  6= (Wt). If ^  > (Wt), then Lemma 8 is violated
because we have a contract, namely the continuation contract at Wt, which achieves a higher patient
welfare than (Wt). Now suppose ^  < (Wt). Then we can simply replace the continuation
contract at Wt with the optimal contract that achieves (Wt) and strictly improve patient welfare,
thus violating the optimality of the original contract. Incentive compatibility is maintained because
we have substituted a continuation contract with the same continuation value to the bad surgeon.
A.2 Optimal Contract for the Good Surgeon
Although the proofs in this section are inspired by the techniques developed in Sannikov (2007b),
they require novel applications of continuous-time techniques due to the presence of adverse selection.
Because incentives of two types of agents, i.e. an agent and a deviating agent, are being considered,
the sensitivity Y appears not only in the denominator but in the numerator as well. As a result, the
sensitivity that minimizes the HJB equation for a given action is not always the minimum sensitivity
that enforces that action.
A.2.1 Incentive Compatibility
Lemma 10. For a given pair of strategies AG and AB for the bad and good type surgeon, let fY G
t g
and fY B
t g be associated processes in the representation WG
t (AG) and WB
t (AB). A pair of strategies
(aG;aB) is optimal if and only if
aG 2 argmax
a g(a;G) + Y G(a;G) and (A.2)
aB 2 argmax
a g(a;B) + Y B(a;B) (A.3)
Proof. The proofs for both the good surgeon's optimal strategy AG and the bad surgeon's optimal
strategy AB are essentially identical to the proof of Proposition 2 in Sannikov (2007b), and we do
not repeat the analysis here.
A.2.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 11. The RHS of the HJB equation (HJB-GOOD) is continuous and dierentiable in Y .
Proof. First, consider the case that 0(WB) >
GkB
BkG. For 0 < Y <
G
0(WB)kG, we have aG(Y ) = 0
and aB(Y ) = 0, and the RHS is continuous. When Y =
G
0(WB)kG, the good type is indierent
between aG(Y ) = 1 and aG(Y ) = 0 while the bad type chooses aB(Y ) = 0. Since the denominator of
the RHS doesn't depend on aG(Y ), we only need to compare the numerators when aG(Y ) = 0 and
aG(Y ) = 1, respectively:
(WB)   g(0;G)   0(WB)(WB   g(0;B) + Y ((0;G)   (1;B)) and
(WB)   g(1;G)   0(WB)(WB   g(0;B) + Y ((1;G)   (1;B)):
48Subtracting the second from the rst yields  G +
G
kGkG = 0. For
G
0(WB)kG < Y <
B
kB, we have
aG(Y ) = 1 and aB(Y ) = 0. At Y =
B
kB, the bad type is indierent between aB(Y ) = 0 and
aB(Y ) = 1. Again, comparing numerators we have
(WB)   g(1;G)   0(WB)(WB   g(0;B) + Y ((0;G)   (0;B)) and
(WB)   g(1;G)   0(WB)(WB   g(1;B) + Y ((0;G)   (1;B)):
Subtracting the second from the rst yields 0(WB)B   0(WB)
B
kBkB = 0. So we have our result.
Lemma 12. Given initial conditions (0) = 0 and 0(0) = 0, there exists a solution to (HJB-
GOOD) that is unique and continuous in 0. Moreover, initial conditions with 00(0) < 0 result in
a concave solution.
Proof. Consider the HJB equation (HJB-GOOD) with initial conditions (0) = 0 and 0(0) =
0. Since the RHS is continuous and dierentiable in all its arguments over all Y , it is Lipschitz
continuous. It also satises linear growth conditions. Therefore, solutions exist, are unique and are
continuous in 0.
Suppose (W) is concave at some point. Then 00(W) < 0 for all W 2 [0;1]. The reason
is that if 00(W) = 0 at any point, say ^ W, it follows that (W) must be a straight line, i.e.
(W) = ( ^ W) + 0( ^ W)(W   ^ W) for all W since
minY
( ^ W)+0( ^ W)(W  ^ W) g(aG(Y );G) 0( ^ W)(W g(aB(Y );B)+Y ((aG(Y );G) (aB(Y );B)))
r2Y 2=2
takes the same value for all W. A corollary is that if 00(W) > 0 at any point, then 00(W) > 0 for
all W.
Lemma 13. There exists a unique solution (W) to the HJB function that satises the boundary
conditions (0) = 0 and (1) = 1. Moreover, (W) is strictly increasing and strictly concave for
all W  0.
Proof. Suppose a solution exists. First we show it is unique. Consider two solutions  and   of
the HJB equation where  satises (0) = 0 and 0(0) = 0  1 and   satises  (0) = 0 and
 0(0) = 1 > 0. We claim that  0(W) > 0(W) for all W > 0, which implies  (W) > (W) for
all W > 0 (and thus the solution that satises both boundary conditions must be unique).
Suppose it is not true that  0(W) > 0(W) for all W > 0. Let ^ W be the smallest W such that
 0(W) = 0(W). Then  0(W) > 0(W) for all 0 < W < ^ W and it must be that  ( ^ W) > ( ^ W).
Look at the HJB equation at ^ W for both   and . Let Y be the minimizer in the HJB equation
for   at that point. Since the derivatives are the same for both functions at this point, the optimal
aG(Y ) and aB(Y ) are the same, and the only dierences in the two equations is ( ^ W) versus  ( ^ W).
It follows then that ^ 00( ^ W) > 00( ^ W), which is inconsistent. So the claim must be true.
Next, we show that the solution exists. From Lemma 12, which tells us that solutions are unique
and continuous in 0, there exists a 0 > 1 such that the unique solution to the HJB equation with
initial conditions (0) = 0 and 0(0) = 0 satises (1) = 1. The reason is that as we increase 0
from 1, the corresponding solutions strictly dominate each other in the sense that A(W) > B(W)
for all W > 0 if A(W) is the solution for the HJB equation with a higher initial condition 0
49than that for B(W). So there must exist a unique 0 such that the corresponding solution exactly
satises the boundary conditions.
Now we show the solution  is strictly concave for all W > 0. Let ^  be the solution to the HJB
equation with initial conditions (0) = 0 and 0(0) = 1. ^  is strictly concave. Looking at the HJB




kBg, we have aG(Y ) = 0 and aB(Y ) = 0,
which imply the RHS is at most
 ((0;G) (0;B))
r2Y 2=2 < 0. Therefore ^ 00(0) < 0 and by Lemma 12 (W)
is strictly concave for all W > 0. Now suppose the solution  is not concave. Then it must be
convex (it cannot be a straight line). But a convex solution must pass below ^  and this contradicts
our rst claim that  0(W) > 0(W) for all W > 0. Therefore,  must be strictly concave.
Finally, since (W) is strictly concave, (0) = 0, (1) = 1 and (W)  1 for all W, it follows
that  must always be strictly increasing.
A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Lemma 14. Consider a solution  of equation (HJB-GOOD). Let aG : [0;1] ! A, aB : [0;1] ! A
and Y : [0;1] ! [0;1) be the minimizers in (HJB-GOOD). For any initial condition W0 2 (0;1),
there exists a unique weak (in the sense of probability law weak) solution to the equation
dWt = r(Wt   g(aB(Wt);B) + Y (Wt)((aG(Wt);G)   (aB(Wt);B)))dt + rY (Wt)dZG
t (A.4)
that species fWtg. The contract CG = fG;AG;ABg with AG = faG
t g and AB = faB
t g gives
the deviating bad surgeon continuation value Wt at any time t, and is dened by aG
t = aG(Wt),
aB
t = aB(Wt), and G being the rst time that Wt hits either 0 or 1. CG is incentive-compatible
and implies an expected payo of W0 to the bad surgeon and an expected payo of (W0) to the good
surgeon.
Proof. Theorem 5.5.15. of Karatzas and Shreve (1991) tells us that there is a unique weak solution of
(A.4) (in the sense of probability law) if the drift and volatility of Wt are bounded, and the volatility
is strictly positive. We just need to show that Y (Wt) > 0 and is nite. Suppose Y (Wt) = 0. Then
aG(Wt) = 0 and aB(Wt) = 0, and the right hand side of the HJB equation (HJB-GOOD) would have
(W) 1 0(W)(W  1) as the numerator. But notice that 0(W) >
1 (W)
1 W for all W since  is
strictly concave. Therefore the numerator is positive, implying 00(W) > 0, which is a contradiction.
So Y (Wt) > 0. Next we show that Y (Wt) is bounded from above. Suppose Y (Wt) is large enough
so that aG(Wt) = 1 and aB(Wt) = 1, and the numerator on the RHS of (HJB-GOOD) becomes
(Wt) G  0(Wt)(Wt  B) 0(Wt)Y (Wt)((1;G) (1;B)). Is it ever the case that the RHS
is strictly decreasing in Yt so that the minimizing choice Y (Wt) is unbounded? This is only the case
if 00(W) > 0, which is again a contradiction.
Clearly CG is incentive compatible since we require it in the solution to the HJB equation. To
show that Wt = Wt(AB) and that CG implies an expected payo of W0 to the bad surgeon and an
expected payo of (W0) to the good surgeon, we follow identical steps to the second half of the
proof of Lemma 7 and do not repeat the analysis here.
Lemma 15. Consider a solution  of equation (HJB-GOOD). Any incentive-compatible contract
C = f;AG;ABg achieves expected discounted patient welfare at most (W0(AB)).
Proof. Given an incentive-compatible contract C = f;AG;ABg, denote the bad surgeon's continu-
50ation value by Wt = Wt(AB) (as in (5.2)). Let AB = faB






t ;G)ds + e rt(Wt):




t ;G)   (Wt) + 0(Wt)(Wt   g(aB
t ;B) + Yt((aG








We just need to show that the drift is non-positive. By denition of the HJB equation, however, the
drift must be non-positive because
(Wt)  g(aG
t ;G) + 0(Wt)(Wt   g(aB
t ;B) + Yt((aG






for all Yt and corresponding incentive-compatible pairs (aG
t ;aB
t ).
It follows that Kt is a bounded supermartingale until the stopping time, and hence the expected
patient welfare a time 0 is less than or equal to EAG
[Kt]  K0 = (W0).
The nal step is to show that the continuation value of the good surgeon (i.e. expected patient
welfare) stays on the curve (Wt) for any time t almost everywhere when the bad surgeon's continu-
ation value is Wt. To do so, we use an \escape argument" along the lines of those made in Sannikov
(2007c) and Faingold and Sannikov (2007).
Lemma 16. Consider a solution  of equation (HJB-GOOD). Consider the corresponding contract
constructed according to Lemma 14 with initial condition WB
0 . At any time t, the continuation value
of the good surgeon is equal to (WB
t ) (i.e. stays on the curve ).
Proof. Suppose the claim is not true and that in the optimal contract the continuation value of
the good surgeon follows a process t such that t > (WB
t ) for some t. From the Martingale
Representation Theorem we know there exists a process f
tg such that t satises
dt = r(t   g(aG
t ;G))dt + r
tdZAG
t :
Let Lt = t   (Wt). The drift of Lt can be written as rLt + d(aG
t ;aB





t ;G))   r0(Wt)(Wt   g(aB
t ;B) + Y (Wt)((aG




and the volatility v(
t;Wt) is equal to
r(
t   0(Wt)Y (Wt)):
Incentive compatibility requires that
aG
t 2 argmax
a g(a;G) + 
t(a;G) (A.5)
We want to show that if L^ t > 0 for some ^ t, then Lt grows arbitrarily large with positive probability,
which then leads to a contradiction since both t and (WB
t ) are bounded processes. To do so,
51proving the following claim is sucient: For every  > 0, there exists a  > 0 such that for all t  0
either (a) the drift of Lt is greater than rLt    or (b) the absolute value of the volatility of Lt is
greater than .
Suppose Et > 0 for some t. There exists constants c1;c2 > 0 such that jr
t   r0(Wt)Ytj > c2
for all j
tj > c1 since 0(W)Y (Wt) is bounded (0(W) is bounded by initial condition 0(0) = 0
and we have argued in the proof of Lemma 14 that Y (Wt) is bounded).
Fix some  > 0. Consider the set  of tuples (aG;aB;W;
) 2 AA[0;1]R with j
j  c1 such
that aG, aB are incentive compatible and d(aG;aB;W)   . Since d is a continuous function and
 is a closed subset of the compact set f(aG;aB;W;
) 2 A  A  [0;1]  R : j
j  c1g, it follows
that  is compact.
Notice that jv(
t;Wt)j is also continuous. Hence it achieves its minimum  on . We claim  > 0.
Suppose  = 0. Then we argue that d(aG;aB;Wt) = 0, which would contradict our denition of the
set . When the volatility of Lt is exactly 0, then 




g(a;G) + 0(Wt)Y (Wt)(a;G)
i.e. aG
t = aG(Wt) and therefore d(aG;aB;Wt) = 0. So  > 0 and jv(
t;Wt)j   on . Then it
follows that for all (aG;aB;W;
) 2 AA[0;1]R that satisfy incentive compatibility constraints
(A.5), either d(aG;aB;Wt) >   or jv(
t;Wt)j  minfc;g > 0. So we have proven the claim and
we have our contradiction.
An identical argument leading to a contradiction holds if t < (Wt) for some t.
A.3 Properties of the Good Surgeon's Contract
A.3.1 Proof of Proposition 4
To prove the rst part of the proposition, for the good surgeon's optimal action policy, proving the
following lemma is sucient.
Lemma 17. If aG(W) = 0 for some W, then aG(W0) = 0 for all W0 > W.
Proof. Consider some point W at which aG(W) = 0. Let Y = Y (W) be the sensitivity in the optimal
solution at point W, which enforces aG(Y ) = 0 and aB(Y ) = a 2 A = f0;1g. It follows from the
HJB equation that for all Y 0 such that Y 0 enforces aG(Y 0) = 1 (and hence Y 0 > Y ), we have
(W)   1   0(W)(W   g(a;B) + Y ((0;G)   (a;B))
r2Y 2=2

(W)   G   0(W)(W   g(aB(Y 0);B) + Y 0((1;G)   (aB(Y 0);B))
r2(Y 0)2=2
: (A.6)
We want to show that for any W0 > W, it is strictly better to use Y (which must also enforce
aG(Y ) = 0 at W0 since 0(W0) < 0(W)) than any Y 0 that enforces aG(Y 0) = 1. Note that if Y 0
enforces aG(Y 0) = 1 at W0, then it also enforces aG(Y 0) = 1 at W (again since 0(W0) < 0(W)).
Also Y and Y 0 enforce the same aB at each point. So we just need to show that
(W0)   1   0(W0)(W0   g(a;B) + Y ((0;G)   (a;B))
r2Y 2=2
52
(W0)   G   0(W0)(W0   g(aB(Y 0);B) + Y 0((1;G)   (aB(Y 0);B))
r2(Y 0)2=2
: (A.7)
Notice that if the right hand side of (A.7) is positive, the result follows trivially. Therefore we only
need to consider (W)   G < 0(W)(W   g(aB(Y 0);B) + Y 0((1;G)   (aB(Y 0);B)) (because
otherwise it implies (W0)   G > (W0)(W0   g(aB(Y 0);B) + Y 0((1;G)   (aB(Y 0);B)), i.e. the
RHS of (A.7) is positive). So we can rewrite (A.6), which we know to be true, as
(W)   1   0(W)(W   g(a;B) + Y ((0;G)   (a;B))




(A.7) follows if this inequality holds:
(W0)   1   0(W0)(W0   g(a;B) + Y ((0;G)   (a;B))
(W0)   G   0(W0)(W0   g(aB(Y 0);B) + Y 0((1;G)   (aB(Y 0);B))

(W)   1   0(W)(W   g(a;B) + Y ((0;G)   (a;B))
(W)   G   0(W)(W   g(aB(Y 0);B) + Y 0((1;G)   (aB(Y 0);B))
which we can re-write with positive numerator and denominator:
1   (W0) + 0(W0)(W0   g(a;B) + Y ((0;G)   (a;B))
G   (W0) + 0(W0)(W0   g(aB(Y 0);B) + Y 0((1;G)   (aB(Y 0);B))

1   (W) + 0(W)(W   g(a;B) + Y ((0;G)   (a;B))
G   (W) + 0(W)(W   g(aB(Y 0);B) + Y 0((1;G)   (aB(Y 0);B))
Let w(Y ) = g(a;B) Y ((0;G) (a;B)) and w(Y 0) = g(aB(Y 0);B) Y 0((1;G) (aB(Y 0);B)).








The fraction at W0 is the ratio between the dark red line and the dark blue line. Meanwhile, the
fraction at W is the ratio between the light red line and the light blue line. Since the slope of the
tangent line at W0 is smaller than the slope of the tangent line at W, the ratio is smaller at W0. So
we are done.
53To prove the remaining claims in Proposition 4, we introduce some notation. Dene Y (aB;aG)
as the unconstrained value of Y for which the RHS of the HJB equation reaches its extremum given
an action pair (aB;aG) 2 f0;1gf0;1g. Writing out the FOC and setting it equal to 0, we get that
the extremum is reached at
Y (aB;aG) = 2
(W)   g(aG;G)   0(W)(W   g(aB;B))
0(W)((aG;G)   (aB;B))
:
Y = 0 is also a possibility but there the RHS of the HJB equation is undened (i.e. it blows up). If
(aG;G) > (aB;B), the RHS of the HJB equation is increasing in Y so long as
Y > 0 and Y > Y (aB;aG); or Y < 0 and Y < Y (aB;aG)
Thus, when Y (aB;aG) > 0, the minimum of the RHS of the HJB equation is reached at Y (aB;aG).
Otherwise, the function asymptotes to  1 as Y approaches 0 (so the minimizing Y is the smallest
Y ).
When (aG;G) < (aB;B) (which is only possible at (1;0) when there is overlap, i.e. 0 =
(0;G)   (0;B) < kB), the RHS of the HJB equation is increasing in Y when
0 < Y < Y (aB;aG); or 0 > Y > Y (aB;aG)
Thus, when Y (aB;aG) > 0, the function asymptotes to  1 as Y approaches 0 (so the minimizing
Y is the smallest Y ). When Y (aB;aG) < 0, the minimum of the RHS is reached at Y (aB;aG) and
the minimizing Y is the biggest feasible Y .
We can rewrite Y (aB;aG) as follows:
Y (aB;aG) = 2
(W) 1 0(W)(W 1)
0(W) + aG G
0(W)   aBB
(0   aBkB + aGkG)
:
Notice that as W ! 1, the term on top
(W) 1 0(W)(W 1)
0(W) ! 0. Furthermore, as W ! 1, 0(W) <
1.
The following table summarizes the minimizing values of Y for each action pair (aB;aG). First,
suppose there is no overlap, so 0 > kB:
(aB;aG) Feasible, so Y (aB;aG) Infeasible, but Y (aB;aG) > 0 Y (aB;aG) < 0










































Now suppose there is overlap, so 0 < kB:






Lemma 18. There exists an  2 (0;1] such that for all W 2 [1   ;1], an optimal action strategy is
54aG(W) = 0 and aB(W) = 0, i.e. the good surgeon and the deviating bad surgeon both do not screen
patients.
Proof. Suppose W is close to 1. Let's compare the feasible minimum achieved by the RHS of the
HJB equation for the action pair (0;0) and the feasible minimum achieved by the RHS of the HJB
equation for the action pair (1;1). We know that Y (0;0) > 0 and Y (0;0) is feasible for all W close
to 1. Suppose Y (1;1) > 0 so that Y (1;1) denes a minimum. Let's compare (0;0) and (1;1) at
Y = Y (1;1). The RHS of the HJB equation for (1;1) is
(W)   1   0(W)(W   1) + G   0(W)B   0(W)Y (0   kB + kG)
r2Y 2=2
and the RHS of the HJB equation for (0;0) is
(W)   1   0(W)(W   1)   0(W)Y 0
r2Y 2=2











0 kB+kG as W ! 1 so that Y (1;1) > 0 implies that
G
0(W) > B. So
the condition holds, and (0;0) achieves a lower value.



















kB, then the minimum is achieved for (1;1) at
B
kB. Notice that in this case, (1;1) at
Y =
B
kB achieves the same value as (0;1), so the minimum value of the RHS of the HJB equation
for (0;1) is at least as small as the RHS of the HJB equation for (1;1). Therefore, we need only









kB for W close to 1. We want to show that the feasible minimum achieved by
the RHS of the HJB equation for the action pair (0;1) is always higher than the feasible minimum
achieved by the action pair (0;0). Notice that for W close to 1, it must be that Y (0;0) is feasible.
What about Y (0;1)? We know that 0 < Y (0;1) <
G
0(W)kG for W close to 1. We show that the
RHS of the HJB equation reaches a lower value for Y (0;0) at (0;0) than at Y (0;1) at (0;1), and
therefore it follows that (0;0) is preferred. Directly plugging in terms, we get
 (0(W)0)2
2r2((W)   1   0(W)(W   1))
< 0
Doing the same for Y (0;1), the RHS of the HJB equation for (0;1) becomes
 (0(W)(0 + kG))2
2r2((W)   1   0(W)(W   1) + G)
55Comparing the two, we nd the following is a necessary and sucient condition for (0;0) being
smaller:
 (0(W)0)2
2r2((W)   1   0(W)(W   1))
<
 (0(W)(0 + kG))2
2r2((W)   1   0(W)(W   1) + G)
 (0)2
((W)   1   0(W)(W   1))
<
 (0 + kG)2






G(0)2 > kG(20 + kG)
where  = (W) 1 0(W)(W  1) ! 0 as W ! 1. Thus for values of W close to 1, (0;0) attains
a lower value for the HJB equation than (0;1).
Finally we show that (0;0) is preferred to (1;0). Notice that as W approaches 1, Y (1;0) ap-
proaches
B
kB 0. If there is overlap, so that 0 < kB, then Y (1;0) > 0 and the minimizing Y
is
B
kB. On the other hand, if there is no overlap, then Y (1;0) < 0 and the minimizing Y is again
B
kB. Since the RHS of the HJB equation takes the same value for (1;0) and (0;0) when Y =
B
kB, it
follows that the feasible minimum for (0;0) is weakly lower than that for (1;0).
Therefore, it is always the case that for W close enough to 1, it is optimal to have aG(W) = 0
and aB(W) = 0.
Let WH denote the interval such that aG(W) = 0 if W 2 WH. Let WL denote the interval such
that aG(W) = 1 if W 2 WL. Note that WH = [0;1]nWL.
Lemma 19. If aB(W) = 1 for some W 2 WL, then aB(W0) = 1 for all W0 < W.
Proof. Suppose aB(W) = 1 for some W 2 WL. We show that aB(W0) = 1 for all W0 < W. For
aB(W) = 1, there must exist a Y 0 
B
kB such that
(W)   G   0(W)(W   B + Y 01)







for all Y <
B
kB where 1 = (1;G) (1;B).20 Notice that Y 0 still enforces aG(W0) = 1 for W0 < W.
Also notice that for all Y <
B
kB, 1   Y (1 + kB) > B   Y 01. Suppose W   B + Y 01 < 0.
Then, in order for 00(W) < 0 it is necessary that (W) < G. We can see from the following picture
that the ratio on the LHS of (A.9) increases for any W0 < W. Let w(Y ) = 1   Y (1 + kB) and
w(Y 0) = B   Y 01.









The thin blue line represents the numerator at W and the thin red line represents the denominator
at W. The thick blue line represents the numerator at W0, and the thick red line represents the
denominator at W0. Notice that concavity implies that the ratio between the blue line and the red
line increases as W moves to W0.
Now suppose W   B + Y 01 > 0. Then the numerator in the fraction (which is negative)
decreases by (0(W0)   0(W))(W   B + Y 01) > 0, which is greater than the amount by which
the denominator (which is also negative) decreases, i.e. (0(W0) 0(W))(W  1+Y (1 +kB)).21
Therefore the ratio must increase, so aB(W0) = 1.
Lemma 20. aB(W) is a weakly decreasing step function in W 2 [0;1].
Proof. Consider W 2 WH. We claim that if Y (0;0) is feasible, then aB(W) = 0 is optimal. Suppose
Y (0;0) is feasible. First consider when there is overlap so 0 < kB. In this case, if Y (1;0) > 0,
then the minimum is achieved at
B
kB and so (0;0) is weakly preferred. If Y (1;0) < 0, then the
minimum is achieved at
G
0(W)kG, where (1;0) takes the same value as (1;1). Since (1;1) is not
optimal, (1;0) cannot be.
Now consider when there is no overlap so 0 > kB. In this case if Y (1;0) < 0, then the
minimum for (1;0) is reached at
B
kB, at which point the same value is implemented as (0;0) at that
value of Y . Hence, (0;0) is weakly preferred. If Y (1;0) > 0 on the other hand, then Y (1;0)
implements a global minimum. Let's compare (1;0) and (0;0) both at Y (1;0). The term for (0;0)
is smaller if and only if 0 < 0(W)(Y kB   B), i.e. Y >
B
kB, which is true whenever Y (1;0) is
feasible. If Y (1;0) is too small, then the minimizing Y is
B
kB, which implies that (0;0) leads to a
lower value. So we have proven our claim.
Notice that Y (0;0) is decreasing in W so that if Y (0;0) is feasible at some W, then it is feasible
for all W0 > W. Therefore, if (0;0) holds for some W 2 WH, then (0;0) is optimal for all W0 > W.
So we know Y (W) is a step function over WH and over WL. We just need to make sure now that
aB(W) doesn't jump from 0 to 1 right when aG(W) jumps from 1 to 0. In order for that to happen,










B. So as W increases




kG), (0;1) must be optimal. And
21Note that if the denominator is ever positive, the claim holds trivially.






Suppose that is the case. For (0;1) to be optimal, Y (0;1) must be feasible because otherwise
we would just replace (0;1) with (0;0) or (1;0) and get the same value. But notice that Y (0;1) is




kG, it must be that Y (0;1) is converging towards
B
kB, which is not true. Hence, we must not have that discontinuous jump.
Lemma 21. The function Y G(W) = 0(W)Y (W) is a strictly decreasing function.
Proof. As W goes from 0 to 1, there are two possibilities for the path of action pairs (aB;aG) that
we have characterized. First, the path may go from (1;1) to (1;0) to (0;0), or just from (1;0) to
(0;0). If the path begins at (1;1), then Y (1;1) is the minimizing choice of Y , so that 0(W)Y (W) =
(W) 1 0(W)(W 1)+G 0(W)B
0 kB+kG and hence 0(W)Y (W) >
G
kG and 0(W)Y (W) > 0(W)
B
kB. As W
increases, (1;0) becomes optimal and for Y (1;0) to be the minimizing Y , then
G
kG > 0(W)Y (W) >
0(W)
B




kB > 0(W)Y (W).
Hence it follows that Y (W) is decreasing.
The other possible path of action pairs is from (1;1) to (0;1) to (0;0), or just from (0;1) to (0;0).





kG. As W increases, (0;1) becomes optimal and thus 0(W)
B
kB > 0(W)Y (W) >
G
kG.
Finally, as W approaches 1 and (0;0) is optimal, then 0(W)Y (W) <
G
kG and 0(W)Y (W) <
0(W)
B
kB. Hence it follows again that Y (W) is decreasing.
Lemma 22. There is generically a discontinuous jump downward in Y (W) when aG(W) goes from
1 to 0.
Proof. The jump occurs either as the optimal pair of actions goes from (1;1) to (1;0) or from (0;1) to





Furthermore, it must be that when (1;0), Y (1;0) <
G
0(W)kG or else (1;1) would achieve a weakly
lower value. However, the minimizing Y for (1;1) must be at least as large as
G
0(W)kG. So this
implies that for there to be no jump Y (1;0) = Y (1;1) =
G
0(W)kG, which does not hold generically.





0(W)kG. So Y (0;0) 
G
0(W)kG. In order for there not to be a jump, we need
Y (0;0) = Y (0;1) =
G
0(W)kG, which does not hold generically.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 1
To prove Lemma 1, we need to consider more general contracts of the form C = fD;AG;ABg where
D = fDtgt0, AG = faG
t gt0 and AB = faB
t gt0 (of course, we require feasibility so Dt 2 [0;1],
aG
t ;aB
t 2 A for all t  0). So rather than a stopping time  such that Dt = 1 for all t <  and Dt = 0
for all t  , contracts can now specify Dt anywhere between 0 and 1 at all times.
58First, consider the contract for the bad type. The principal's amended optimization problem is



















t ;B)dt j  = B

 ^ WB (A.11)
where faB
t g is incentive compatible, aB
t 2 A, and Dt 2 [0;1].
Next, consider the contract for the good type. The principal's amended optimization problem is




















t ;B)dt j  = B

 ^ WB (A.13)
where faG
t g;faB
t g are incentive compatible, aG
t ;aB
t 2 A and Dt 2 [0;1].
Just as before, we conjecture that an optimal contract for each type is characterized by the
solution to the relevant HJB equation. By following the methods of this paper directly, we can verify
our conjecture and prove uniqueness and concavity of the solution (for the sake of space, we do not
repeat the analysis here).
For the bad type, we denote patient welfare by F(W) and nd that the HJB equation is as follows:
F00(W) = min
D;Y
F(W)   Dh(a(D;Y );B)   F0(W)(W   Dg(a(D;Y );B))
r2IDt>0Y 2=2
s:t: F(0) = 0 and F(1) = h(0;B); (A.14)
where a(D;Y ) = 0 only if Y
D 
B
kB and a(D;Y ) = 1 only if Y
D 
B
kB. Let D(W), Y (W) and
a(W) = a(D(W);Y (W)) be the minimizers on the right hand side of the HJB equation. This
unique and concave solution to the HJB equation corresponds to the following contract, which we
can verify is optimal. The contract uses Wt as a state variable and sets Dt = D(Wt), Yt = Y (Wt)
and at = a(Wt) for all Wt. Wt is initialized at some W0 and solves
dWt = r(Wt   Dtg(at;B))dt + rYtIDt>0dZt:
For the good type, we denote patient welfare by G(WB) and can write the HJB equation as
G00(WB) = minD;Y
G(WB) Dg(aG(D;Y );G) G0(WB)(WB Dg(aB(D;Y );B)+Y ((aG(D;Y );G) (aB(D;Y );B)))
r2IDt>0Y 2=2
s:t: G(0) = 0 and G(1) = 1; (A.15)
59where aG(D;Y ) = 0 only if Y
D 
G




aB(D;Y ) = 0 only if Y
D 
B
kB and aB(D;Y ) = 1 only if Y
D 
B
kB. Let D(WB), Y (WB),
aG(WB) = aG(D(WB);Y (WB)), and aB(WB) = aB(D(WB);Y (WB)) be the minimizers in the
HJB equation. This unique and concave solution to the HJB equation corresponds to the follow-
ing contract, which we can verify is optimal. The contract uses WB
t as a state variable and sets
Dt = D(WB
t ), Yt = Y (WB
t ), aG
t = aG(WB
t ), and aB
t = aB(WB
t ). WB






t ;B) + IDt>0Y B
t ((aG
t ;G)   (aB
t ;B)))dt + rY B
t IDt>0dZAG
t :
Lemma 23. In an optimal contract, a principal chooses Dt 2 f0;1g.
Proof. We can prove the result for the bad contract from rst principles without using the HJB
representation. Suppose CB is an optimal contract for the bad type that species demand Dt 2 (0;1).
Formally, the contract species an Xt-measurable demand process D = fDtg and an Xt-measurable
incentive-compatible advice of actions A = fatg for the bad surgeon. Following Proposition 1 of
Sannikov (2007b), we know that we can represent patient welfare Ft(D;A) in this contract as a
diusion process: there exists an Xt-measurable process Y = fYtg such that
dFt(D;A) = r(Ft(D;A)   Dth(at;B))dt + rYtdZA
t :
Recognizing that we can similarly represent the bad surgeon's value as a diusion process, we apply





So at = 0 only if Yt
Dt 
B
kB, and at = 1 otherwise.
Now, we dene a feasible and incentive compatible contract ^ CB such that ^ at = at for all t and
^ Dt = 1 whenever Dt > 0 and ^ Dt = 0 whenever Dt = 0. We guarantee incentive compatibility by
dening the sensitivity process so that at remains optimal: whenever Dt > 0, ^ Yt = Yt
Dt, and whenever
Dt = 0, ^ Yt = Yt. It now suces to show that in order for CB to be optimal, it must be that Dt = 1
whenever Dt > 0.
Dene the time-t expectation of aggregate patient welfare by
^ Vt = r
Z t
0
e rs ^ Dsh(as;B)ds + e rtFt(D;A)
if the principal has followed contract ^ CB until time t and then plans to follow contract CB after time
t. The drift of the process under the probability measure PA is
d^ Vt = re rt ^ Dth(at;B)dt   re rtDth(at;B)dt + re rtYtdZA
t
=) d^ Vt = re rt( ^ Dt   Dt)h(at;B)dt + re rtYtdZA
t
If ^ Dt > Dt on a set of positive measure, then the drift of ^ V is positive on a set of positive measure.
60Thus, there exists a time t > 0 such that
EA[^ Vt] > ^ V0 = F0(D;A)
which contradicts the contract CB being optimal. Therefore, if CB is optimal, ^ Dt = Dt for all t and
thus Dt 2 f0;1g.
Now consider an optimal contract CG for the good type. Recall that Dt = D(Wt) where D(Wt) is
the minimizer on the right hand side of the HJB equation. The HJB equation is linear in D though,
so clearly the minimizing value is either D = 0 or D = 1. Therefore Dt 2 f0;1g.
Lemma 24. In an optimal contract, if Dt = 0 for some t  0, then Dt0 = 0 for all t0  t, i.e. there
is only license revocation, not license suspension.
Proof. First, consider the contract for the bad type. The HJB equation (A.14) can be written
F(W) = max
a;D;Y




If D = 0 for any W > 0, then F(W) = maxa;Y F0(W)W = F0(W)W and F(W) is a straight line.
On the other hand, If D = 1 for that W > 0, then F(W) = maxa;Y h(a;B)+F0(W)(W  g(a;B))+
F00(W)
2 r2Y 2. We know that there exists a concave solution F that satises the relevant boundary
conditions. This is strictly preferred to the straight line solution which arises if D = 0 for any W > 0.
Thus, it cannot be that Dt = 0 for any t unless Wt = 0 (i.e. the license has been revoked).
A similar argument holds for the good type contract. The HJB equation A.15 can be written
G(WB) = max
aG;aB;D;Y





Again, notice that if D = 0 for any W > 0, then G(W) = G0(W)W and G is a straight line. Since
we know there exists a concave solution that satises the boundary conditions, it cannot be that a
straight line is optimal. So it cannot be that Dt = 0 for any t unless Wt = 0 (i.e. the license has
already been revoked).
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